The conference is structured into four panels in a circular structure opening with the NATO Defense College Foundation taking a first and foremost to refocus in a timely and practical integration and for the transatlantic link alike and continues to stay not as passive actors. NATO and the EU are there to lead the way towards a more integrated future, its partners and the countries that have some transnational reach and cultural openness.

Since it is a body with considerable freedom of movement, the Foundation is developing a wider action, transnational reach and cultural openness.

The Foundation was born three years ago and is rapidly expanding its highly specific and custom-tailored activities, achieving an increasingly rapid pace of integration.

The charter specifies that the NDCF works in close cooperation with NATO. Through the form of cooperation with NATO, the Foundation is developing a wider action, transnational reach and cultural openness.

The NDCF is a unique think-tank: international with regional cooperation and logically closing with Bosnia. The first panel analyses the evolution of regional cooperation and the outstanding issues. The second panel analyses critically the importance of the EU-brokered Serbia-Kosovo deal.

The third panel analyses the evolution of regional cooperation and the outstanding issues. The fourth panel analyses the evolution of regional cooperation and the outstanding issues.

The conference features four panels, taking a fresh look at all the relevant issues. The first panel analyses the evolution of regional cooperation and the outstanding issues. The second panel analyses the evolution of regional cooperation and the outstanding issues. The third panel analyses the evolution of regional cooperation and the outstanding issues. The fourth panel analyses the evolution of regional cooperation and the outstanding issues.

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The continuation of this collaboration is important for the strengthening of the European integration and for the transatlantic link alike and the development of a more integrated future, its partners and the countries that have some transnational reach and cultural openness.

Indeed with a forthright, factual and practical debate the conference has shown that integration has made great strides, the problems to be solved need engagement and determination from all sides and that NATO and the EU are there to lead the way towards a more integrated future, its partners and the countries that have some transnational reach and cultural openness.

Yet, well before the change of perceptions due to the continent repercussion of the Ukrainian crisis, the Balkans were still an important region both for the EU and NATO, where the two institutions have traditionally worked hand in hand, achieving results that reflect the Berlin plus framework.

This conference is an absolute first in EU presidencies witnessing a close collaboration between the EU Presidency of an important member state like Italy and a NATO-affiliated foundation. The objective of the NATO Defense College Foundation is to focus in a timely and practical way the issue of the Western Balkans, avoiding the continuation of the coexistence of different "Bosnias" and looking at how to bridge the past with a fragile federal structure where different obstacles and the opportunities.

This was the lesson of the Marshall Plan and this should be the idea driving the kind of co-operation with NATO. Through the form of cooperation with NATO, the Foundation is developing a wider action, transnational reach and cultural openness.

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The NDCF is a unique think-tank: international by design and based in Rome, due to its association with the NATO Defense College. Its added value lies in the objectives stated by its charter and in its international network.

The charter specifies that the NDCF works with the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance, its partners and the countries that have some form of co-operation with NATO. Through the Foundation the involvement of USA and Canada is more fluid than in other settings.

The Foundation was born three years ago and is rapidly expanding its highly specific and customer-tailored activities, achieving an increasingly higher profile, also through activities dedicated to decision makers and their staffs. It is the first time that the NDCF contributes to a EU Presidency.

Since it is a body with considerable freedom of action, transnational reach and cultural openness, the Foundation is developing a wider scientific and events programme.
THE FUTURES OF INTEGRATION

WESTERN BALKANS

Conference organised by the NATO Defense College Foundation

in cooperation with

the Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union
and the Balkan Trust for Democracy
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Speakers’ biographies
Maps and names are illustrative and not authoritative. They do not prejudice any current diplomatic issue nor are meant to represent any official position or that of the NDCF.
FYROM

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FOREWORD

Our young Foundation has decided to hold a full conference on the Balkans, with as many actors as possible, because of the relevance of this region for the whole of Europe.

This part of the continent has not made the front page of the newspapers since some years. It is perhaps good news. On the other hand the danger is that the Euro-Atlantic community forgets the Balkans. In many capitals there is a propensity to think that the Balkans are a mission accomplished because they are no more a source of acute crisis, while the road to NATO and the European Union seems to be open.

In a way this is true, many things have been accomplished and regional cooperation is on the rise. In some cases accession is already a fact. On the other hand we are living in a world going faster by the day with many unbalances and with threats arising in various ways. The danger for the international community is to focus on the apparent threat of the day and not to look at a very substantial rest.

South Eastern Europe has old problems still to be solved and new challenges to be confronted. It has to keep speed towards internal reforms, cooperation and integration into the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. Otherwise it will fall behind.

One thing to keep in mind is that South Eastern Europe represents a significant dimension not only in political but also in economic terms. The size of the population and of the market has not to be underestimated. I am speaking of South Eastern Europe because the historic Balkans, those of one century ago, have evaporated. As a matter of fact today there are not precise, well defined borders of the region.
We have invited as speakers to the conference distinguished personalities from countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Turkey because we feel that an overall regional view is needed. Inclusiveness is important and it is wrong to take in isolation certain countries only because they represent a traditional interpretation of the Balkans.

We are very proud of this achievement, in other words to give light to a part of Europe that otherwise risks to be considered by somebody of an inferior quality vis-à-vis the old members of the European Union.

We have given the opportunity to speak to as many national voices as possible. The philosophy of the NATO Defense College Foundation is not to have a top-down approach, to host mainly great international personalities; but rather to hear the views of the local societies. Our purpose is not to have high profile events to raise our visibility, but to address strategic issues at their heart, focusing on the people who are living the specific situations.

It is perhaps worth recalling that the objective stated in our Charter is “to promote the culture of stability and well-being in the Euro-Atlantic area and in partner countries”. It is inspired by the preamble of the Washington Treaty of 1949. In other words we are a “do it” institute aiming at addressing relevant strategic, political, geo-political problems in a straightforward and pragmatic way. We prefer to look at the solutions of problems rather than going into a lengthy pseudo-intellectual analysis of their causes.

I am very grateful to the Italian Presidency of the European Union for the support that we have received. Italy has a tradition of openness and interest in the Balkans that has been confirmed once again and this is not surprising. The German Marshall Fund has helped us through the Balkan Trust of Democracy. I thank warmly the GMFUS, a long standing supporter of the region. We have not a propensity for fruitless debates and therefore for stand-alone events. We would like to follow up with projects directed at inclusiveness and networking among people. If there is one issue standing up among others in South Eastern Europe, this is fragmentation. There are at least a dozen initiatives in the area, many of them in existence only since a short time, that do not appear to be effective in fostering more communication that binds societies together. The Foundation would like to broach the subject and tackle the problem differently with a specific endeavour on which we are working.

I sincerely believe that we have an obligation to accompany in a friendly way millions of Europeans towards a more mature cooperative society. Something that will serve not only theirs but also our interest.
The conference addressed the subject through four sessions each dedicated to a specific topic:
1. Regional co-operation
2. The Serbia-Kosovo agreement
3. NATO, Europe and the state of integration
4. The Bosnian issue.

During a debate that was forthright, factual and practical, several relevant points emerged. Contrary to a long standing tacit belief that the Western Balkans were practically a dormant issue waiting to be a case closed in some distant future, the Ukrainian issue showed that NATO is and will remain a security guarantee in the area. In order to deepen this guarantee, both member and candidate countries must take seriously obligations and duties implied by the Alliance, knowing that the accession path is a reciprocal long-term engagement. The same crisis demonstrates that European countries are, as a matter fact, interdependent when it comes to stability and that the security/energy nexus links member countries and the Balkans to the Black Sea issues.

Regarding the EU, it is useful to understand that the much debated declaration of the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, about news accessions means essentially that that quality will be considered more important than speed in preparing new memberships. The European Union will continue an enlargement policy that started after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Arguments like “the house is full” are considered counterproductive for the interests of everybody.

This means that, notwithstanding the existing obstacles, the Western Balkan countries are called to increase a regional co-operation where there cannot be winners or losers, like in a regatta, because the interest of the whole region is ob-
jectively at stake and has to be taken into consideration starting with the crucial
dossiers of economy, energy security and security.

As a framework for enhanced regional co-operation one could usefully conceive
the creation of a Balkans Five (B5) group, similar to the Visegrad Four, whose
members want to belong simultaneously to NATO and the EU, co-operating
among themselves to achieve this objective in the most effective and synergic way.

This context is obviously complicated by the present spreading of pragmatic
populism. This is a particularly serious risk because it undermines Europe’s coher-
ence widening the traditional Euro-sceptic front and allowing external powers to
manipulate the European political landscape.

Among all these developments the Serbia-Kosovo agreement is of fundamental
importance and was possible also because the parties were convinced that it was
useful to be solved specific problems, besides progressing on a future accession.
Many other problems need to solved the legal status of Serbian Northern Kosovo
municipalities; an inclination of the Serbian leadership towards Russia; a resis-
tance to a more streamlined state policy in matters of energy, public companies
reform and subsidies; outdated Serbian national security and national defence
strategies; a meaningful reappraisal of the presence of EULEX. This needs again a
very clear, insightful and determined approach by the EU and NATO in assisting
the two countries and fostering responsible partnerships.

Analogous considerations are valid for the outstanding Bosnian situation. This
country needs a fresh approach to allow the civic society to get out of a protract-
ed quagmire by stressing the requirements of institutional functionality, financial
affordability and empowerment of civic stakeholders. This entails that Bosnia has
to become again a European priority and that the international community has to
radically overcome the Dayton “acquis” by re-launching the integration road map
for Bosnia Herzegovina. Sarajevo should get an early promise to start a process of
integration and the European Union should combine the investment in institu-
tional capacities fostering civic society with strategic economic investment.
Western Balkans should not be characterised by opinion makers just by the two words “enlargement” and “fatigue”, implying that in this region the only possible strategy is to wait until problems, both within the EU and within the countries of the area, fade away. Facts are rather different.

Regional co-operation, an indispensable ingredient for European integration, has made some significant progress among the Western Balkan countries: Croatia and Slovenia have solved a protracted border dispute; Serbia and Croatia have noticeably increased bilateral relations, despite some contretemps; Kosovo and Serbia signed a major deal, mediated by the EU in times of widespread crisis, and are now expected to implement all the measures agreed; in 2008 the Regional Cooperation Council, involving all regional parties plus other relevant countries and international institutions, has been established and follows a concrete work programme. This collaboration is actively supported by other valuable multidimensional tools like: the Central European Initiative, the CEFTA, the EU Strategy for the Danube, the upcoming EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region and the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative.

Regarding practical integration steps, Croatia has joined the EU, Serbia and Montenegro have opened accession talks and Albania has been confirmed as candidate for a full membership. Taking into account a wider Euro-Atlantic context, Albania and Croatia are NATO members since 2009, while Montenegro is supposed to join the organization in due time.

Taking stock of these advances, it is now important to increase the momentum for the following reasons:

- Avoiding the spread of Euro-scepticism within and around Europe;
• The Ukrainian crisis might re-ignite some very unwelcome national issues in the region;

• Western Balkans have been seriously affected by the global economic and financial crisis and their recovery will have positive effects also in the Eurozone.

The following concepts might help in conceiving appropriate political and diplomatic actions in order to achieve an orderly integration at the right pace:

• **A new narrative for integration.** Enlargement is not a bureaucratic process in itself, possibly tied to the flow of huge financial funds. It is essentially about fundamental values like social rights, transparency, good politics and free market. It is also a matter of positive transformations, from assistance to active membership in the global community: “it is in the Balkans that the EU must show that it has the power to transform weak states and divided societies” (Rome Declaration, 2006);

• **An inclusive economic paradigm.** Until now the global financial crisis has pushed the EU in a zero-sum economic game. The current situation shows that this attitude has not achieved any significant gain for any country, creating instead a negative economic spiral affecting the whole continent. After two decades of heavy political and financial investment, it simply does not make sense to lose a 20 million people market that can be affordably integrated.

• **A virtuous multi-speed integration dynamic.** Experience has shown that bloc-like integrations have hidden costs that are higher than expected. Western Balkan countries have different paces of integration, but the EU can and should maintain a certain degree of cohesion: it should clarify that this path is neither multi-bilateral nor exclusive and that Europe’s role is to facilitate progress in integrating these countries. Reforms in each country are indeed the empowerment tools that governments and citizens can calibrate according to their priorities and to the general trends in the region. Naturally the EU has to devote particular attention to partners like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM, so that they are able to overcome legacies, recurring tensions and difficulties and participate to a virtuous integration dynamic.

• **NATO is still playing a relevant role** in the region and its effective interaction with the EU is as a matter of fact a success without precedents in international affairs.

The NATO Defense College Foundation intends, in due time and with the appropriated collaborations, to pursue its activity in the Balkan area also through the creation of a specialists’ network, tailored to the current and future policy needs.
BALKAN INTEGRATION: THE JOB MUST BE FINISHED

Hon. Minister Zolevski, Minister of Defense of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo, President of the NATO Defense College Foundation,
Dear colleagues and dear members of the diplomatic corps,
Distinguished guests,

Welcome to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and thank you very much for granting me the opportunity to open this two days event focused on the Western Balkans and on the perspective of their European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The event comes at the turning point of the Semester of the Italian Presidency of the EU Council, where the Western Balkans are one of the key priorities inspiring our political action during the second half of 2014.

Italy has been and continues to be among the main supporters of the advancement of the Western Balkans countries on their European and Euro-Atlantic path. We are deeply convinced that only by joining the common European house the full stability of the area can be considered as fully achieved.

The strong commitment of the Italian Government in supporting the non EU and non NATO members of the area in their progress towards EU and NATO integration is shown by the continuous assistance provided by Italy in various domains (from the financial one to aid, to cooperation in the police, security and justice sector, just to mention a few). Along the years, Italy, through its continuous efforts, has become one of the main partners of the Region and –if you allow me the expression – a “testimonial” of the Western Balkans.

This focus on the Western Balkans is particularly strong during the Italian Semester of Presidency of the EU Council as you can easily find in the Presidency’s program and activities. At a political level the visit of the Hon. Minister Federica
Mogherini to all the non-EU Western Balkans Countries at the very start of the Semester was an important opportunity to deliver a strong message of encouragement and support to the respective Governments. During her visit in the region, Minister Mogherini reiterated Italy’s full and continuous support to the Western Balkans countries involved in the integration process and, while expressing the highest appreciation for the remarkable results so far achieved, she has invited each one of them to adopt those reforms which are considered crucial to progress on their European path.

Our clear strategic aim is to enable the Balkan countries to get closer to the EU by helping them achieve the political and economic standards required, enabling them to access the European Union in the shortest time possible.

But the EU accession process – which will still need a very long time to be accomplished – must not be considered as a one way only process. While the Governments of the countries willing to join the EU are called to make further efforts to fulfill the necessary standards to advance on their European path, the EU countries are expected to provide adequate recognition to the improvements achieved. Otherwise both of us would see our credibility at stake.

This should not be considered as a secondary or less important aspect of the integration process, especially in the current European scenario where the phenomenon of the so called “enlargement fatigue” is starting to raise as a very strong factor, conditioning the position of the public opinions as well the political attitude of various member States.

It has to be clear though that we will keep on viewing the enlargement process of the Balkans as an “unfinished job” until every country of the area will be fully integrated in the EU as well as euro Atlantic family.

In 2014, we have seen important developments in the integration process of the Western Balkans in the EU, especially with two events: the opening of the Intergovernmental Conference with Serbia and the concession of the candidate status to Albania. These two crucial passages have not been isolated, but have been accompanied by relevant progress of the other countries in the area, such as the opening of new chapters in the access negotiations of Montenegro in the EU and the finalization of the text of the EU Association and Stabilization Agreement between the EU and Kosovo. From our side, we are also confident that the other countries of the area willing to move ahead towards the EU, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, can soon achieve tangible results in this domain that can be comparable to those of their neighbors.
Aside from the progress of the Western Balkan countries on their European path, allow me to mention also another aspect which is pivotal within the Italian Presidency of the EU and which is represented by the launch of the new EU macro regional strategies.

The Italian Semester is indeed particularly focused on the adoption of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian region by the European Council in October, and by a launching event of the Strategy itself organized by Italy at the highest political level taking place in November in Brussels.

This Strategy brings together 8 countries both EU and non EU members (Italy, Slovenia, Greece, Croatia, Albania, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro) which have contributed with their input to the adoption of the related Action Plan in key and concrete sectors such as fishing and blue economy; infrastructure and energy; environment; tourism and culture; research and innovation, capacity building. The imminent adoption of the EU Strategy will represent one of the deliverables of the Italian Semester itself. Once activated, the new Strategy will be fundamental in raising the standards of its non EU members in the above mentioned sectors, consequently improving their capabilities in fulfilling the requirements set by the EU to pursue their integration. The Adriatic Sea has to be perceived as a “common basin” from third countries just as many important portal areas around the world. For instance, Trieste and Capodistria (as well as Venezia and Rjeka) cannot continue to be seen as two different entities in competition among themselves and with no background infrastructure connecting them. We have to start thinking in a different way. The establishment of these different kinds of cooperation will accelerate the integration of the Balkan Area and improve the economic situation for all.

This two days Conference, for which I praise Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo for the organization and for his extraordinary capacity in bringing around the table such high level participants, will be articulated in the discussion of 4 topics – namely the regional cooperation of the area, the Serbia-Kosovo relationship, the Euro-Atlantic perspective and the Bosnian issue –which are at the core of the debate about the future of the Western Balkans and which represent some of the main crossroads laying ahead along the European path of the region. I hope that the key message that will be delivered from this Conference to the Countries of the area that are still struggling in their European and Euro-Atlantic path, will be that the benefits of overcoming these difficulties will be far more rewarding than the costs to achieve them.

I would like, therefore, to express my best wishes to you all for the most constructive and successful work during the next two days.
It is an honour for me to briefly address the opening of this important conference on the future of Western Balkans and their integration into the North Atlantic community. Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo, as Deputy Secretary General of NATO, has always been a champion in its efforts to enlarge the Alliance and it makes me very happy to see that he remains committed to the cause. I would also like to thank the NATO Defense College Foundation, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador Mattiolo for organizing this conference, so important for Southern-East Europe, which has constantly supported the dialogue for a free democratic and peaceful Europe.

Ladies and gentlemen, the fact that we are here, committed to find a common path to integrate my region in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, is a significant symbol of our shared values, namely freedom and democracy. Indeed, despite the well-known differences which characterize the Balkans, we are all united in our shared values and in our desire to become members of the European Union and of NATO. And we want that above all for the wellbeing of our citizens.

Now, I have excellent speechwriters in my Ministry and they prepared a very good speech for me today. But let me speak from my heart. I spent all my diplomatic life – more than 22 years – trying to bring my country on the path of the Euro-Atlantic integration. I wanted, and I still want, to see the whole region moving towards Europe. We have achieved a lot, but Europe will only be completely free and peaceful when the Western Balkans will be fully integrated into the European Union and NATO. For what concerns our commitment, I am confident that all citizens from the Western Balkans – and not just the political leadership – would love to see their countries members of the European family.

Are we perfect? No, we are not. Are we committed to Euro-Atlantic integration
and to the necessary reforms to get there? Yes, we are. And those reforms are done first and foremost for our citizens. To create stronger democracies, by strengthening the rule of law, fighting corruption and creating an open market economy. All that will increase the quality of life of our citizens and that is the reason why we would like to become members of the European Union and NATO. Again, the reforms we are working on are not just an effort to join both the Union and the Alliance but they are, first, the result of the intention of creating strong democratic societies in our region.

In the nineties, we had a difficult time, with conflicts spreading all over the region. But we have managed to come together and work together towards a common objective: joining the EU and NATO. Some of the countries in the region have moved faster and we are proud of them. We are proud of Albania joining NATO, as we are proud of Slovenia and Croatia entering both the European Union and NATO. All the advancements that any country in the region has made have a positive impact on the others. Moreover, the stability of Balkans is crucial, insofar it deeply affects the wider stability of whole Europe. It happened more than once, in my career, that I have been talking to Ambassadors and Senators in Washington DC and I always pointed out how a stable Macedonia or Montenegro are able to bring stability to the whole region, consequently impacting on Europe’s stability. We should remember this now as well.

In addition, from the other perspective, we have seen what the European Union and NATO have brought to the region. During the conflicts in the nineties NATO was of big help, stabilizing the situation and bringing us back to the path of prosperity towards stronger economies and democracies. Now we are in a position to be partners. We have Macedonian soldiers serving shoulder to shoulder with NATO soldiers in Afghanistan. Moreover, my country is the fourth biggest per capita contributor to ISAF forces.

This is only an example, a consequence of shared values and a symbol of our will to be partners, bringing peace, prosperity and democracy to other parts of the world. However, at the same time, we are strongly committed to strengthen our societies, in order to be able to finally join the European Union and NATO. It will be a long process and we know that, but we – politicians and citizens – all are firmly convinced this is the path to follow. In my country, for example, we are trying to implement reforms on our own, while making sure they are fully compatible with the EU requirements. However, it would be much easier if we would open negotiations with the EU and together work out a roadmap to transform society. The academia, together with the political class, is working to be included in those processes, which are so important to us.
The membership in NATO and the EU are the strategic interests of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. My country is investing huge efforts in the reforms directed towards achieving that interest.

The reform steps that we take with sincerity and commitment encompass all segments of social life. However, they are not a goal by themselves, nor the sole motive for their implementation is the formal accession to the EU and NATO. Our commitment to the continuous reforms is founded on the desire and need to improve the overall social life, strengthen the legal system and to ensure economic prosperity and better health care system in view of increasing the quality of life of our citizens.

In the context of reforms, I would like to underline the part regarding the meeting of the criteria for NATO accession. It is a well-known and recognized fact that the Republic of Macedonia met the requirements for joining NATO back in 2008. Unfortunately, to the general disappointment of the political leadership and all citizens, a great historic injustice was inflicted to the Republic of Macedonia at the Bucharest Summit as we did not receive a formal invitation for a fully-fledged membership to NATO due to the veto by our southern neighbour.

Six years after Bucharest, my country still feels the consequences of this injustice; nevertheless, the enthusiasm has not abandoned us yet.

A confirmation of the above statement is the continuous harmonization of the legislation, the social reforms, and of course, the most tangible example whose manifestation is so evident – the contribution of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia to international operations led by the UN, NATO and the EU.

As Minister of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia, I would like to take this opportunity to send a clear and unequivocal message that I consider the membership of the Republic of Macedonia in the Euro-Atlantic structures as a win-win situation for everyone. When I say “everyone”, I am primarily referring to the sustainable peace, stability and prosperity of my country, the Region to which we belong, but also to Europe and in broader terms as well. The integration of the Macedonian citizens and the country as a whole, means gaining the long desired sense of safety and security, economic prosperity and welfare.

Moreover, one must not neglect the political component and the fact that the membership of the Republic of Macedonia in the Alliance will create favourable
conditions for overcoming the open issue with our southern neighbour.

Integration of Montenegro and the Republic of Macedonia - a clear message and a positive impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina and whole region

Many are wondering WHETHER the countries from the Western Balkan Region should integrate into NATO and the EU – my position on this question is certainly positive. All checks and balances indicate the positive advantages for both NATO and the EU and the Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

NATO and the EU, and every one of us, need to see the big picture of the region. The integration of the Western Balkan countries in both organizations will expand the area of security and stability and will ensure comprehensive development.

The NATO and EU membership of the Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro will be a major step towards strengthening the security and stability of Europe. It will send positive signals to neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia and it will be an additional incentive for continued implementation of reforms for full Euro-Atlantic integration. The integration of all countries from the Region of the Western Balkans will complete the integration process on European soil. All Western Balkan countries will become contributors to the regional, European and global peace and security. Together, this will provide long-term stability and security, not only in the Western Balkans, but also to the entire European continent and the world.

In the past two and half decades, the Euro-Atlantic organizations, NATO and the EU, have invested much effort, forces and resources in building stability and security in the Western Balkans. The results are widely recognized and visible. Most of the Western Balkan states are integrated into these Euro-Atlantic structures, while the other countries have reached a stage in the integration process beyond a turning point. Every further delay of the enlargement process will be discouraging. Therefore, I consider the position both stated at the Berlin Conference in August this year and at the September NATO Summit in Wales as positive, as it demonstrated a reaffirmation of the commitment for full integration of the countries from the Western Balkans.

REFORMS IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE – SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL INTENTIONS

The reforms in the Ministry of Defence and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia fully support the political intentions of the Republic of Macedonia for acquiring full-fledged integration into NATO and the EU. They are implemented in the long
term and the results achieved so far indicate a substantial effect in terms of a better, more efficient and result oriented functioning. We have built a small, but mobile, highly professional and interoperable army that earns considerable respect based on the excellent performances in both exercises and actual operations. Since 2002, the soldiers of the Army of Republic of Macedonia have continuously participated in international operations. To date, over 50% of the overall Land Force structure of the ARM have contributed to these complex and highly responsible operations. The high level of training, courage and enthusiasm of our soldiers, which bear the Macedonian flag in the international operations and promote our country as one of the greatest contributors to global peace per capita, make me, as Minister of Defence, and the ordinary citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, immensely proud. The contribution to international operations remains a top priority of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia. In the future, we shall continue to contribute in the EU-led ALTHEA and the UN-led UNIFIL operations, whereas in terms of the Resolute Support operation in Afghanistan beyond 2014, we are planning to deploy training and advising instructors and experts. Moreover, we are always open for cooperation and looking into other possibilities for contribution in line with the needs of the Allies and our possibilities.

**POLITICAL CONSENSUS ON THE SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC ISSUE AND THE PUBLIC SUPPORT OF THE CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

In addition to the continuous reforms in the segments of the social life, there is a broad political consensus among all political parties in the Republic of Macedonia on finding a solution to the significant strategic issue for NATO and EU membership. I am particularly proud of the fact that the public support for Euro-Atlantic integration in the Republic of Macedonia is around 90%. It is a figure that clearly reflects our strong commitment for attaining full-fledged integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures. The Republic of Macedonia is fully prepared to undertake the obligations and responsibilities of a NATO member and to begin the EU membership accession negotiations.

At the end, let me assure you – and I believe that I speak for the whole region of Western Balkans now – that we remain strongly committed, and I believe that the reforms we are working on are of extreme importance, not just because they will help us come closer to the Euro-Atlantic integration but also, more importantly, because they are important to our citizens and for our citizens.

Concluding, I would like again to thank you very much for organizing this conference and point out how crucial is the exchange of views among politicians and the academia for any progress to be achieved.
Session 1

REGIONAL COOPERATION:
ANOTHER STEP FORWARD
IN THE BALKANS OR WHY WE NEED A B5 GROUP

THE UNTHINKABLE YESTERDAY, PROVES ITSELF A NECESSITY TODAY. HISTORY IS FULL OF SUCH PARADOXES.

A region-wide cooperation in the Balkans - some 20 years ago this idea would have been considered Utopian. Today the region enjoys a sufficiently large networks of structures - ranging from those at state level (Southeast European Cooperation Process, Regional Cooperation Council, a number of sectorial organizations), to business, media, academia and NGOs. The radical change that took place, however, reveals a sense of regional identity and a clear-cut understanding about the importance of regionalism. All this happened against the background of numerous historical contradictions, current conflicts and even recent armed clashes in Southeast Europe.

Meanwhile, most countries in the region joined the European Union and NATO. This entails the next step on the agenda – establishing a new field for cooperation similar to the Visegrad 4. It is not the first time that such an idea is launched in public. It even seems to be a rather obvious one, but still far away from reality.

Regional cooperation has strong roots and a long history in Europe, reaching its climax with the creation of the European Union. Benelux (since 1944), numerous formats of Nordic and Baltic regional co-operation, the Central European Initiative, Mediterranean cooperation - the list is endless. Globalisation further enhanced the role of regional co-operation, including within the EU.

The establishment of a B5 Group (Balkans 5) seems a natural step at a stage when Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Romania and Slovenia have already joined the

1 Published in 24 Hours daily newspaper, Sofia, April 4, 2014 written together with Lyubomir Kyuchukov
EU. It will be logical if these five countries lay the basis for such co-operation - political will and national interest being the only necessary prerequisites.

The example of Visegrad 4 is convincing enough – from the point of view of the results and perspectives for such cooperation, but also with regard to its role in overcoming existing fears and prejudices. V4 is a model for equitable participation without leadership or domination.

There is only one and a very clear criterion for joining B5 – membership in both the EU and NATO. Participation in B5 does not imply membership – it should rather be designed as a process for co-operation of mutual interest. V4 actions, history and traditions of regional co-operation in the Balkans within the SEECP (South-East European Cooperation Process) prove that such a light unbinding institutional framework could be workable and efficient. The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria is proud to be one of the promoters of the creation of the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) by giving the idea to the then Secretary-General of NATO Willy Claes in 1995. The Brigade itself was established in August 1999 in Plovdiv, Bulgaria.

B5 should be an open process. Normally each country from the region, joining the EU and NATO should find its place in the group. The mere accession to the Euro-Atlantic institutions should serve as a necessary and sufficient condition for each Balkan country to join B5 – solely on the basis of a clearly stated political wish, without any additional precondition or accession procedures and with no vetoing power vis-à-vis other B5 member states.

B5 should serve as a platform for consultations, coordination and cooperation – within the EU framework, on the basis of the EU principles, in the interests of the B5 participating states, but also in the interests of all countries from Southeast Europe and of the EU as a whole. Effective solutions at regional level could be sought by joining efforts in such fields as energy, infrastructure, environmental protection, communication, culture, etc. where problems go well beyond state borders.

B5 is not conceived as a precluding format. It is not designed to create new division lines in the region. Quite the opposite – it is an inclusive effort, based on the common experience of those who have already accomplished their Euro-Atlantic integration and in support to the others, who have not yet met the membership criteria.

B5 does not undermine existing regional cooperation. It should build upon regional achievements and could serve as a key element in the concept of creating a network of networks as a stable basis for Balkan cooperation.
The debate on the future of Europe, on deepening the integration processes and continuation of enlargement with the Western Balkan countries also requires more active, more coordinated regional positions. With the establishment of B5, the Southeast European countries would take another important step in their joint activities – a transition from “co-operation in the region” to “co-operation for the region”. B5 could be the representative of the Balkans in Brussels, upholding regional interests in the Euro-Atlantic formats.

Bulgaria has played a pioneering role in 1996 by launching the idea of regional cooperation that gave birth to SEECP. It seems that the time has come to propose, discuss and eventually make the next move in building up the architecture of multilateral co-operation in the region – the establishment of a Visegrad in the Balkans. Thus shaping a new, positive image of the Balkans – as an area of dialogue and mutual understanding.
REGIONAL COOPERATION
IN A WIDER POLITICAL CONTEXT

After the turbulent 90s regional cooperation has been promoted as a recipe for reconciliation and confidence building. In time, establishing good mutual inter-state relations made its way into the conditionality packages of negotiations for the European Union and NATO membership. A considerable number of initiatives have been beneficial in terms of bringing sometimes distant regional players to the table. However, this is only the basic function of regional cooperation. When it comes to practical benefits for the respective countries and to bringing those countries closer to the EU and NATO, it is hard not to conclude that the results have been limited at best. In fact, regional initiatives seem to be detached from whatever is going on in NATO and the EU.

On the one hand, the EU and NATO laid down conditions for membership to the applicant countries but the enlargement fatigue made the Euro-Atlantic family largely unengaged in the process of fulfilling these criteria. In these circumstances the conditionality for EU and NATO membership – instead of serving as a practical tool and guidance – became a way of keeping the struggling candidates and aspirants at bay.

Some Southeast European countries need continuous assistance along this path. At the same time, the political leaders in SEE know that the membership of their countries in NATO, and especially in the EU, is not very close (very likely beyond their political terms in office) which logically takes away their enthusiasm for undertaking painful political, economic and administrative reforms.

This creates a vicious circle in which the current EU and NATO approach does not succeed in bringing stability and prosperity to the region of Southeast Europe. Something has to be changed.
The first step to take is to admit that all those countries face challenges that are more severe than the conditionality imposed on them. Some of the countries badly need help in order to overcome those challenges.

Consequently, the political and institutional problems of the Southeast European countries should find their way back to the agenda of NATO and the EU. Both Brussels and the member states should start genuine co-operation on finding solutions instead of limiting their engagement to checking whether the membership criteria are met or not.

Finally, it goes without saying that applicants and candidates cannot be admitted to the EU and NATO just like that. They have to meet the criteria first. And the best way to equip and prepare them for this task is by engaging them to the greatest possible extent in whatever NATO and the EU are doing (e.g. defence reforms, international operations and missions etc.) regardless of their respective phase in the integration process.

That is where the success of regional co-operation lies too. Instead of being conceived as a confidence-building mechanism, it should be as concrete as possible. Regional cooperation should make aspirants and candidates prepared for future membership while at the same time making their political leaders and population increasingly feel and think like they were already EU and NATO members.
The last time that I spoke in this very room at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy was over ten years ago. At the time, I was working for the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Romania was about to be a NATO member and not yet an EU member. Italy was holding the EU presidency. A substantially smaller EU in fact. Things have changed significantly since for the EU, for Romania as well as its region, Balkans included.

At the time, the discussion was about Romania’s negotiations to join the EU. This time around, I am going to talk about politics. The politics of language and perception but also the politics of conformity and self-interested but narrow pragmatism. European politics impact the Balkans mainly from three points of view often tightly bundled: security, energy and prevailing values.

Let me first add a note on imaginary and political geographies. Several speakers in this conference highlighted the importance of geography and the specific names attached to the various parts of a region. Until the Crimean crisis, the EU and to a lesser degree NATO too appeared blighted by “enlargement fatigue” and the heavy burden of dealing with increasingly piling up internal and external crisis. In fact, many critics claim Europe and NATO have lost some of the dynamism that allowed them to be active players in the Balkans. This has allowed other players to assume a leadership role and challenge existing alignments and influence and destiny of the region. On EU and NATO’s watch, the region has emerged as an interregnum of sorts. A fragmented strategic geography inside an already divided political geography.

Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis shattered Europe’s often-cavalier approach to its neighbourhood. The invasion of Crimea and ongoing security crisis in Ukraine energised NATO and pushed Europe back in an active role. Lingering discomforts
have suddenly become major symptoms and a proof of real risks and evidence of EU’s complacency.

During the past decades, these organisations and their representatives have tried, with various degrees of success, first to stop the spiral of violence in the Balkans. Then Europe has worked hard to put the pieces back together between broken communities and economies. Along with the US, NATO and EU have ultimately stabilised the region and one by one its constituent nations joined an integrated security and normative space.

The enlargement game formally goes on. The appetite for solutions however is less tangible. The invasion of Crimea and the crisis in Ukraine have put things in perspective but did not change entirely the regional dynamic. Despite obvious joint interests, lasting differences in some cases patronymic have blocked Macedonia’s NATO membership.

Names and mental historical and cultural geographies obviously still play an outsized role here. However, these institutionalised divided geographies while do have significance they are not insurmountable. The fact that Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria have all joined the EU, that Croatia and Albania joined NATO shows that enlargement remains important and that it works. The names used do not take countries away from the Balkans and do not lessen our collective obligation to find lasting and inclusive solutions for the region. Names cannot take these countries away from the Balkans any more than from Europe, or the Mediterranean area.

It used to be that the Balkans affected Europe. Today things are far more even. The Balkans already belong to Europe and whatever happens there, more or less remotely, will affect the region as a whole. Let’s take immigration, for instance. Bulgaria has to deal with the mismanagement of the crisis in Syria. The same applies for countries like Romania or Moldova. The latter then, even if it is not a Balkan country strictly speaking, participates in a lot of the co-operation processes that are very relevant to the region.

The security implications of Crimea and the violence are resounding in the Balkans.

In fact, I believe that after what happened, what is happening, in Ukraine it is not possible to talk about the Balkans the same way as before. For a long time, almost since the war in Yugoslavia, the agenda reflected exclusively the prevailing processes within the region, or, at best, in the West. Today that is out of the question. Events elsewhere create the agenda, whether we talk about economic integration, energy security or accession to the EU or NATO. On the one hand, it is highly improbable for the Balkans to be subjected to direct military threat, invasion
or destabilisation activities. On the other hand, the region is not immune to the same processes taking place just a bit more to the East. The instruments may be different but energy and investments play an equally relevant role.

In this regard, the Black Sea should also be mentioned. Usually it is not seen as part of the Balkans, however the situation in Crimea is putting it centre-stage as a matter to be considered when addressing whatever part of the region or issue related to the region. Security and energy issues at the Black Sea will impact energy and cross-regional projects throughout South Eastern Europe including the Balkans. With a game changer like Crimea, one needs to expect both the EU and Russia to play a more assertive game. Their objectives and perceptions may be strikingly different and that will make the strategic competition even more important.

Another point which needs to be taken into consideration in this framework is co-operation among countries within the Balkans. That is the necessary starting point for an effective European, transatlantic or regional co-operation, more generally. The energy sector provides a good example. Countries already in the EU and NATO will have to play a greater role and in some form assume responsibility of the region. In my view that can only take the form of supporting the region’s integration in EU and NATO.

The situation in Ukraine reveals a predictable failure in the field of energy security. For a concrete and effective project of energy integration not just the EU needs to be involved but the Balkans, too. In short, energy security issues have to be addressed whether they are specific to a member-state or not. Bulgaria and Romania, for instance, are way behind the schedule when it comes to integration of electricity or gas networks, even if the issue systematically comes up on the bilateral agenda. And today this is not only about lost economic opportunities it is about their contribution to the European energy market and implicitly European energy security. Today, laggards cannot afford to push the issue back anymore.

The same applies for EU level policies and measures, including investment. Energy sector integration and the creation of effective, reliable and resilient energy market ensuring security of supply, competitive price and low carbon is the only option for Europe. After Ukraine, no cheap and one-sided solutions can be afforded by Europe. Those that are tempted to go alone - and there are several countries and politicians in the region and in Europe - will need to face a firm common European positions. When it was about cold cash and influence this game was already seen as dangerous. Today it is directly against our common interest.

Fortunately, my country, Romania, is almost energy independent but most of
the countries in the region cannot benefit all from such a fortunate position. Obviously even energy rich countries cannot afford to look away from energy integration. Indeed, a lack of action may induce more energy-endowed countries to address exclusively domestic demand triggering a breakdown in the coherence of European policies.

Private companies, many of which European, are very much aware of this and actively engage in the region for the integration of gas and electricity networks. Their efforts are of course very welcome but for a coherent result to be achieved, framework policies by the EU institutions are needed.

In this regard, I very warmly welcome Minister Federica Mogherini as the new Vice-President of the EU Commission. With Italy playing this role, the Mediterranean will hopefully come back centre-stage on the agenda, providing a fresh start for a number of Balkan and Adriatic issues. At the same time, an integration of security, regional, economic and integration issues needs to have a clear voice. While the current Commission is formally devoid of an enlargement portfolio, the issue needs to be kept centre stage for the countries in our neighbourhood.

Last, it is not possible to talk about energy, security or EU enlargement without talking about values as well. Too often, these are treated separately. One issue addressed by president Obama first, and then in a more abrupt way also by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland in Bratislava, is EU and NATO countries’ practice of switching on and off gas pipelines at their own pleasure, playing individual games regarding contracts and regional projects all with inevitable consequences on countries like Ukraine. Joint success needs solidarity.

In concluding my remarks, I would like, now, to draw a wider picture, not limited to the Balkans and to my country, and address what I call the risk of “pragmatic populism”. For nearly a decade, pragmatic populism has run throughout Europe. It is supported and embraced in discourse and practice not only by extremist parties but also by the same moderate political forces that helped shaping a united Europe. The very political parties that a decade ago pushed for European integration and transatlantic security co-operation are now ready to pay lip service to values but equally argue for narrow and isolationist approaches. The risk goes beyond the three of Eurosceptic parties. We are confronted by the lasting effects of a serious financial and economic crisis and our response was less than stellar. The EU and its leaders have saved the Euro but Europe’s politicians, locally, regional and nationally are threatening Europe’s coherence. This is successfully fuelled by extremist parties, separatists and isolationists and leaders with direct and increasingly tight links to powers interested in Europe’s weakness.
Pragmatic populism is not the way forward for Europe and its nations. While tempting as a superficial solution in face of economic difficulties and popular discontents, pragmatic populism is simply unable to address the wide range of new issues and challenges, from immigration to the Ukraine crisis, to the Islamic State. Europe’s leaders need to return to a honest debate about the EU’s economic model and again the Italian presidency has a leading role to play here.

We need to face up to the new, post-Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis reality. For the first time in history, people have died under the EU flag on Kiev’s Maidan. It is only symbolic that they are not EU citizens and, at this stage, neither is their country a candidate to EU accession. Europe cannot be the same.

The crisis in Ukraine has pushed Europe and the EU back into active history and out of its simple institutional geography. I would like to conclude by stating that the Balkans are part of the solution for the new wider set of European challenges. These challenges will define the next decade of policymaking and politics in the region as much as Europe’s attitude towards the Balkans will define its new regional power role. At stake are Europe and the neighbourhood’s security, stability and prosperity.
CO-OPERATION: WIN-WIN SOLUTIONS ARE REALLY POSSIBLE

Rather than giving a very general overview, I would like to contribute concretely and concisely to the debate, by offering my perspective on it, i.e. the European perspective.

The first insight I would like to share is about the so called “European enlargement fatigue”. Europe is in a moment of transition and crisis. However, for what concerns transition to a new reality in Europe, I would dare to say that it is the case since years. There are, and always have been, massive splits when it comes to the European project and inevitably the enlargement process is affected. Also this particular period of crisis should be read in the light of Europe’s history and legacy.

To this respect two observations need to be pointed out. First, Europe went through many crises but each time it has managed to come out stronger than before. Second, and this is extremely relevant to the present discussion, Europe keeps its promises. Indeed, the European enlargement process, started after Yugoslavia and developed during the nineties, is a clear sign of continuity in the political will, successfully transformed into a concrete agenda, which has never been abandoned by the Union. That last point becomes even more crucial, given the recent statements by Jean-Claude Juncker about the fact that there will be no new member states in the coming five years. Indeed, the question is about putting quality above speed, in other words, getting adequately prepared to membership. And the European Union will continue to work in this direction, committed as before.

However, the enlargement issue is not the only one on the table. Indeed, global complexities and challenges are not only displayed on the background but they enter the agenda as well. It does not mean that events abroad will exclusively determine the agenda. Rather it means that there are more questions at stake, and enlargement is just one among many. In this framework the region has to help itself. It has to do more and, when it comes to do more, regional co-operation is
essential. Indeed, the entire EU project is based on regional cooperation. It follows that there cannot be winners and losers. Everybody has to win for a successful Europe and the necessary tools for that to happen are already at disposal, if I may say, even stronger than before.

Now I would like to make some considerations out of my personal experience in regional cooperation. I often tried to make a list of all the regional organizations existing and operating in the region and I never managed to come to an end. Of course, there are no limits to the number of organizations allowed to operate in the area. It is necessary however to provide for an added value on the scene, otherwise there is no sense in existing and being active. Also, decisions have to be taken by setting priorities on which issue to address first among economy, energy, security and many others.

Again, the rule is that there cannot be winners and losers. Everything should be managed in the interest of the region as a whole. And that is not an easy concept to many. However, you cannot put together an economic project unless it is done in the interest of all. If there is energy shortage in one place, it is not in the interest of those who have a good supply of energy either. And a win-win situation is not only the solution, but is also concretely possible.

Assisting Lady Ashton in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue has been one of the most exciting experiences of my professional life. I have seen with my eyes that tough decisions can be taken by a great leadership. That is what Europe needs. And it is not in the interest of one against the interest of another but it is in the interest of all. The region as a whole has to make its part, committed as always, the more so because the challenges to face are becoming more complex day after day.
Session 2

THE SERBIA-KOSOVO DEAL: A TURNING POINT?
KOSOVO, THE UNFINISHED

Kosovo remains today an incomplete structure and an unfinished state with a deficient economic viability, excessive external financial dependence and burdened by the regional wide-spread problems of corruption, illegal trafficking and organized crime. Moreover, a number of social concerns, among which poverty and a high unemployment rate, remain unaddressed, worsened by poor governance and a malfunctioning rule of law. The progress made in the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, is due, for a big extent, to the positive use of European soft power, above all in the person of the High Representative, which played a crucial role as facilitator of dialogue. Also the international community played a very constructive role alleviating and managing long standing conflicts in the whole region of Western Balkans.

Although the conclusion of the normalization agreements paved the way for a solution of the conflict between Serbia and the Kosovo Albanians, the implementation of the agreed provisions has been still incomplete. That is partly due to the last national and local elections in Serbia and Kosovo and partly to the very content of the agreements. The latter, indeed, as it is the case for the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia Herzegovina, infringe the principle of equality of all citizens, by differentiating on the basis of ethnic backgrounds. And that has also to be considered a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights. Consequently, the implementation of the normalization agreements remains an area of populist games and internal political controversies, both in Serbia and in Kosovo.

However, the biggest problem with normalization remains the nature, the legal status and the functioning of Serbian municipalities, still in the process of formation. Belgrade’s obvious intention is to maintain informal control over northern Kosovo, by establishing an entity similar to the Republika Srpska in Bosnia Herzegovina, with possible paralyzing effects on Kosovo institutions. To this regard, it is
to hope that the upcoming coalition government in Kosovo will not unduly slow down the normalization process.

For what concerns the international scenario, the conflict over Crimea and Ukraine has had only an indirect impact on Serbia-Kosovo relations. The visit of President Putin in Serbia, for instance, affected Serbia’s relations with the European Union, therefore influencing, even if indirectly, the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue.

Another point, worth to be discussed, is the system of crisscrossing international tutorship over Kosovo, which has proven itself expensive, complicated, confusing and quite ineffective in providing concrete normalization of inter and intra-state relations, as well as healthy social and economic progress in Kosovo. The many actors and overlapping political levels engaged altogether in this system of tutorship, although reflecting the benevolent will of the international community, has produced contradictory and largely dysfunctional effects on Kosovo’s viability as a state.

It is therefore high time to review the international system of tutorship and re-adjust it to the current scenario, which, by the way, has changed considerably since the declaration of Kosovo’s independence. Indeed, the maintenance of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) in six years has cost to the international community around a half of billion Euros and yet it has shown very little effectiveness. The overall level of corruption has not been significantly impacted and although some small fishes have been caught, sharks are still out there and often in very high positions. Moreover, the recent report by the special investigating task force established by the European Union clearly shows that the international presence of about 50,000 soldiers in 1999/2000 failed to prevent crimes against humanity and the widespread violence in 2004. Besides, EULEX has not had stomach, desire and capability, mainly due to its administrative inefficiency, to prosecute chief war criminals in Kosovo. To this regard, the report clearly indicates the need to radically reform and properly recalibrate the mission, possibly reducing its size and reorienting its activities.

The lack of unity among the EU members, doubtful international status of Kosovo and the number of other unresolved problems, remain big obstacles, which can only be faced through integrated and coordinated international cooperation and support.
The Serbia-Kosovo Agreement and the Reform of National Security

Serbia-Kosovo agreements are the best piece of good news coming recently from Serbia. Indeed, it is a huge progress for the whole region. But I would like to highlight another fact which is even more significant: the citizens of Belgrade and other cities in Serbia did not protest at all as the agreements have been announced but, on the contrary, the public support for the government which signed the agreements has grown, showing a certain level of maturity of the Serbian society. Moreover, although the achievements are without any doubt a perfect example of Europe’s soft power, credit should also go to the Serbian prime minister and his team.

Of course it was not all a bed of roses and some problems occurred on the way, especially when it comes to transparency. Also high level political structures of both the EU and the two countries have been forced to deal with topics that usually should be addressed at lower levels, by ministers for instance. But it is important to see the errors of one’s ways and take them into account for the future. Indeed, it is often forgotten that this is the first agreement and that there are concrete expectations of continuing the dialogue, hopefully with a second and third agreement.

What also has to be considered, in particular for what concerns Serbia, is the price charged by the Serbian government for the Brussels agreements, both at domestic and international level. The Serbian prime minister, for instance, adopted Putin-like manners in stark contrast with European practices and, more generally, with democratic processes within Serbia. The result of that, along with increased Russian propaganda, has been a dramatic drop in popular support for European integration, unprecedented to Serbia since its democratic transition and consolidation. According to data provided by the Serbian government, only 46% of the citizens are in favour of Europe. That is a very dangerous piece of news, which should carefully be considered.
Besides, it is important that the perception of the international community vis-à-vis the capacities of the Serbian government remains focussed and balanced. To this regard I hope that the forthcoming report of the European Commission will deliver a more honest account on what has been happening in Serbia in the last years, some of it not being very positive (situation in the media for example, or in the judiciary).

On the other hand, the Serbian political leadership has recently given political support to the fight against the Islamic state, sharing intelligence, mostly about illegitimate fighters recruited in certain parts of Serbia. That kind of cooperation is vital in the current global context. Also, it is worth to mention the recent gay parade organized in Belgrade, displayed without any episode of violence. That means that if political will is accompanied by the might to impose it in the framework of adequate security structures, Serbia can guarantee the constitutional right of all citizens to fight for the recognition of their rights. Last but not least, the recent announcement of the Serbian foreign policy minister, which unveils the final agreement between the country and NATO on the Individual Partnership Action Plan. Considering that the first draft has been submitted almost three years ago and has undergone many changes since, also due to Albanian complaints about the matter, it is a very positive result which hopefully will end all disputes.

Let me now come back to some of the challenges Serbia is still facing. Serbia’s biggest challenge, not often mentioned, concerns its geopolitical position and strategy. Serbia does not have any formal foreign policy strategy. It unfortunately also has pretty outdated national security and national defence strategies. Indeed, both of them need to be updated and readjusted to the recent developments. Serbia does have a specific goal towards European integration and the maintenance of the best possible diplomatic relationship with all the countries in the world. However, this is just a goal and it cannot replace a whole comprehensive strategy.

Unfortunately, war in Ukraine and the increased Russian activities in the region and in Serbia especially, highlight the lack of a foreign policy strategy, which leaves room for Russian intentions to thwart the Serbian-EU integration and thereby suffocating the democratically expressed wishes of Serbians to move towards Europe. As I have already mentioned, strategic documents exist but need to be updated since they still state that the main security threat faced by Serbia is Kosovo. That makes no sense in the framework of the achieved agreements and the process of normalization which is taking place right now between the two countries. To this regard I hope there is room for the Western international community to help Serbia rephrase its national security strategy, maybe highlighting the importance of maintaining peace in Kosovo in order to enter another round of increased communication and cooperation in the security field.
In short, current strategies do not give a good account of the concrete challenges Serbia is facing in terms of security and they do not provide for feasible alternatives. Also explanations of how Serbia as a neutral state can respond to threats are missing. There is a lack of both genuine vision and political courage to direct Serbia towards the only logical direction, that is to say towards liberal and stable Western democracies.

Despite some sources claiming more intensive cooperation with Russia, it is a fact that Serbia has democratically decided to move towards the European Union. That decision has not been imposed and no such thing like “pressure from the political West” exists. Those words, although sometimes used in the political debate, are not fair and confuse the Serbian public. The political leadership, unfortunately, is somehow moving closer to Russia, through the charter of common defence and pushed by economic structures. Indeed, a number of structures deeply embedded in the Serbian government have reasons to slow down the integration process as it hampers their own private interests. In the field of economy, for instance, it is not welcome that the state controls subsidies, or could be in charge of pushing reforms of public companies, particularly in the energy sector. Besides, trials for crimes against humanity or war crimes, facilitated in a European-friendly environment, are often considered a threat.

Those conditions are now overlapping more and more with Russian interests and altogether they risk to stifle the integration process in the entire region. In this geopolitical setup, a deeper co-operation within the NATO framework is necessary to provide for an environment in which the more complex process of EU integration can take place. This specific argument should be carefully considered by all those who oppose further co-operation in the NATO framework.

Concluding, I would like to say that only by prioritising the reforms in security sector, it will be possible to further democratize the country and translate national politics into better regional co-operation. Without this first step it is not possible to move on to other fields, the energy sector above all. The latter, indeed, is often underestimated and remains unaddressed when it comes to diversification of supply and energy efficiency, something unconceivable, given the challenges posed by Russian pressure.
Western Balkans – The futures of integration

NEWBORN MONUMENT
THE SERBIA-KOSOVO AGREEMENT AND ITS DEEP IMPLICATIONS

CONTEXT ANALYSIS

The Western Balkans are nowhere near the top priority list of the NATO and the EU at the moment. The historic Serbia-Kosovo Agreement in 2013 has demonstrated that today armed confrontation is simply not an option in the region; considering the IS and Ukraine crises, just to name a couple right now, it is understandable why there is a reduced interest. This has historically meant a decreased presence, a decreased monitoring and fewer funds from our esteemed foreign partners. However, the impact and the importance of the region of Southeast Europe in the 20th century cannot be overstated. Throughout its history it was the meeting point between the East and West, the role that is still relevant as we shall see later. The Western Balkans have been on the European radar since the beginning of the 1990s as its crisis happened at the same time as the high peak of confidence in the transformative power of the EU and, with the confidence boost of the accession of 10 Central Europeans States, the Western Balkans became the very own European project, one that would be reckless to abandon now.

The region’s relationship with the Alliance is seriously complicated by the fact that this is the only region of Europe ever to be bombarded by NATO. The seed of distrust planted in 1999 is still bearing fruits and hindering the prospects of further integration. Furthermore, the unresolved status of Kosovo still looms over the region and while there is no viable threat of break out of violence, the fact remains that the bilateral relations in the region are strained by the lack of cooperation that is fuelled by separatist tendencies and unresolved minority issues.

THE SERBIA-KOSOVO AGREEMENT

In the wake of these difficulties, the Serbia-Kosovo Agreement might seem like a game changer. The deal opens up a lot of possibilities, but should be taken with
a lot of precaution. The representatives of both government stated that joining the EU was the biggest incentive for sitting through the talks. This can be taken as an encouraging sign that the accession to the EU still captures the interest of these countries and can still be used as leverage in negotiations. However, recent developments in Ukraine and the Middle East are threatening Europe with rising insecurity and the region needs reassurance of its European future, especially considering the criticism already expressed in regards to the EU’s “enlargement fatigue”, inconsistency and the ever-growing number of criteria imposed on the region.

The agreement demonstrated, in part, that what was predominantly lacking in the region is the political will to tackle the underlying issues. The lack of this will is conditioned by the perpetuated rhetoric about ethnicism, of us-vs.-them within these countries, which is fuelled by media biases ‘owned’ by local political elites that thrive on discord and on the perpetuation of the status quo.

The agreement tackled questions that ranged from how to determine the status of the Serb-majority area of Northern Kosovo to how to ensure that border controls would allow the free movement of people and goods. And of course, there was the extraordinarily challenging task facing both prime ministers in presenting the new arrangement to their respective constituencies.

The root cause of this problem lies in the faulty way in which ‘nation building’ was done in these countries through the manipulated transfer of guilt on the neighbouring countries and other ethnicities for purposes of self-determination and self-victimization. Hence, historical ties are very important to the people of the region; the afore-mentioned lack of political will is what drags the region down, making pressures on local political elites a necessary if not crucial part of future strategies for the region.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF BRUSSELS HOUSE STYLE

The Serbia-Kosovo historic agreement certainly carries the potential of irreversible change, much in a similar fashion as did the Kosovo independence back in 2008. However, there is much space for manoeuvering or lack thereof that opens a lot of opportunities for sabotage. The strategy of the foreign partners in the Balkans has so far been to, in an effort to keep the talks afloat, focus on the technicalities and ignore the underlying political causes behind the lack of will to move away from the status quo. This was the case with the Dayton Accords and it was certainly the case with the Serbia-Kosovo Agreement. The difference is that the latter were held at a time when both of the parties have already ruled out the possibility of armed confrontation and both sided have had a clear goal of integrating with the EU.
However, the use of the Brussels House style, the notorious way of getting the parties to commit publicly to an agreement whose content is to be filled in later, is glaring in the case of Serbia-Kosovo, as it was in the case of Bosnia. We have yet to see whether this will prove to be the tool of the conflicting parties in stalling or postponing indefinitely all the decisions, thus causing a stalemate that could potentially bring the country crumbling down. Bosnia has the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to tackle issues as they come along. The current institutional crisis in Kosovo suggests that the space for the abuse of the ambiguities should be reduced to a minimum.

THE RISING TIDE OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS

When considering the relationship of NATO with the region the following should not be overlooked:

• NATO’s enlargement agenda in 2013 hinged on three things: the internal situation within the Alliance due to the lack of the financial sharing of resources, the continuous reluctance of Germany to expand further; and the credibility problems of the candidate(s) (Nic, Majer)

• NATO is going through serious revamping due to the Russia/Ukraine crisis

• Podgorica has played the geopolitical card, using the pretext of the Ukraine crisis to push for more US engagement in the Balkans to counter intensified Russian efforts to undermine the NATO-based regional security architecture.

The crucial issue of the NATO enlargement policy is now Georgia and Moldova, however, given the volatility of the region and the tendencies towards retreating to safety into the arms of the old allies (i.e. Russia), this could mean that incentives rather than conditions should be put forth to the countries of the region to bolster their confidence and ensure continued popular support. (e.g. in the case of BiH setting a date to accession to NATO).

For Bosnia the precursor of accession would be a deadline for dealing with military property and this could possibly break the stalemate that the country has been experiencing since 2005 by giving it a sense of security and belonging. This would necessitate a closer engagement between the High Representative and the NATO liaison in the country.

According to Ronald D. Asmus, the challenge of securing Europe’s eastern border from the Baltics to the Black Sea has been replaced by the need to extend peace and stability along the southern rim of the Euro-Atlantic community - from the
Balkans to the Black Sea and further into Eurasia (a region connecting Europe, Russia and the Middle East), because it involves core security interests including a critical energy corridor.

Working to consolidate democratic change and build stability in this area is as important for Western security today as consolidating democracy in central and Eastern Europe was in the 1990s. It is not only critical for the diffusion of democratic peace in Europe but also vital for the repositioning of the West vis-à-vis both Central Asia and the Middle East. This strategy presents an opportunity to redraw the strategic map of Europe and Eurasia in a way that enhances the security of countries on Europe’s periphery as well as that of the United States and Europe. The United States and Europe also need to rethink what anchoring means in practice. In the 1990s, it meant pursuing membership in NATO and the EU roughly in parallel. Now the West needs to be more flexible and take a long-term view.

The goal is to tie these countries as closely to the West as politics and interests on both sides allow. For some countries, this may mean eventual membership in both NATO and the EU; for others, it may mean membership only in NATO; and for the rest, it may mean membership in neither but simply much closer relations.

STRATEGY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REGION

1. Recognizing and addressing the necessary internal restructuring of the EU. The issue of the ‘enlargement fatigue’ has already been recognized, but it has not been resolved. The lacking of a unified front of the EU member states on the Western Balkans integration, coupled with the crisis of the Union and the prospect of a British exit are making the EU an unwilling partner. The Western Balkans is no longer the biggest threat to European stability; but by not being a priority can make the local political elites go rogue and look for patrons elsewhere.

2. Accepting the fact that the EU has made the Western Balkans its own project and that it is a long-term one. This means addressing the problem of partial and conditional statehood in the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, or at the very least acknowledging the entailed implications. These countries are ill-equipped to handle structural changes and unwilling to address the underlying causes of their crisis, which is why continuous and constant external pressures from the actors placed in ad-hoc positions of power within these countries is paramount. In the case of BiH this position is held by the High Representative and the recent government crisis in Kosovo proves that a similar position is necessary in this case too (it could be taken up by the International Civilian Representative).

Loosening the link between NATO and EU conditioning for admission; admis-
sion to NATO (Montenegro) could boost the confidence of the region and bring more stability. Furthermore, special membership for the region would represent an attempt to reconcile the specific nature of the unfinished post conflict business in the Western Balkans and the devising of different EU integration patterns. It would also serve as an anchor to bind the Western Balkans to the West militarily; this would help stability on two fronts: by reducing possible outside influences by Russia and prevent any kind of internal military mishaps.

Qorraj is quoting Grabbe in stating that the EU accession process is based on the model of previous enlargements rather than being designed specifically to assist and encourage transition economies. Further, Grabbe points out that consequently the structure of incentives and constraints that it imposes on economic and regulatory policies may be inappropriate for countries facing acute development or reconstruction problems. EU policymakers tend to assume that accession and transition require the same policies but, on the contrary, although many accession-related policies are also required for a successful economic transformation, applicants are called on to undertake numerous EU policies that were developed for advanced industrialized economies. These policies were not designed for countries in transition and often require that a complex institutional structure be in place for their implementation.

1. In order to restore EU’s soft power, the Commission should combine the use of multiple thresholds in the process towards membership with intermediate rewards that are geared towards helping to convince local populations of the necessity to continue the pursuit of difficult reforms. The method underlying the Commission’s evaluation and monitoring process is an area that could be modified with relatively ease, especially by increasing the consistency and clarity of the requirements. Most important, it seems clear that given the region’s particular problems, the EU and its bilateral and multilateral partners must co-ordinate their policies and engage the region much more closely to help support their progress towards the EU (Qorraj, 2010).

2. Addressing the problem of institutional crises at state level that arise as a consequence of the ambiguities in the final documents, in this case with the Serbia-Kosovo Agreement. An institutional crisis is happening in Kosovo due to contesting claims on the right to form a government after early elections were held this year. When similar issues happened in Bosnia, the Office of High Representative had the authority to override the decisions or lack thereof by the politicians. Given the earlier mentioned shortcomings of the Brussels House Style in that department it is necessary to appoint someone in a position akin to that of a High Representative. In Kosovo it could be done by expanding the powers of the International Civilian Representative who, according to Aidan Hehir, at
this time serves as the European Union Special Representative. The ICR is chosen by the International Steering Group (ISG) itself including ‘key international stakeholders’. The ICR will be supported in its duties by the International Civilian Office. The ICR “(...) will have specific powers to allow him/her to take the actions necessary to oversee and ensure successful implementation of the Settlement” and may “(...) correct or annul decisions by Kosovo public authorities that he/she determines to be inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Settlement”. The mandate of the ICR is indefinite and can only be terminated by the ISG if it feels the settlement has been implemented.

3. Learn the lesson from the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) war crime court. The inadequate treatment of war crimes committed during the decade of the breakup of Yugoslavia remains one of the top obstacles to reconciliation and reintegration of the civil societies in the Western Balkans. The creation of the war crimes court in Kosovo, albeit reluctantly accepted by the Kosovars, has a great potential in redressing the grievances of the Kosovo Serbs. The creation of this court should be done without any delay in order to prevent the image amongst the Serbian public that the court is there for show. Its potential in shifting the prevalent view that the Serbian people was demonized and used as a scapegoat of the past wars is extraordinary and as such should be used.

CONCLUSION: THREE OPTIONS FOR KOSOVO

I. Integration (opening the path to the EU and cooperation with the region):
   • Continued pressures on governments of Kosovo and Serbia to implement the Agreement;
   • Establish tools to avoid institutional crisis due to constitutional ambiguities (in Bosnia OHR is invested with powers to override political decisions), but it is questionable if the same structure would work in Kosovo. However, the status quo must be avoided;
   • Coming up with a unified front on Kosovo (addressing the concerns of the five states within the Union that have not recognized Kosovo)

II. Status Quo (Kosovo continues to exist in a partial sovereignty limbo, unable to make independent contracts with other states):
   • Kosovo and Serbia do not move the Agreement beyond the face-saving signing stage;
   • North Kosovo continues to rely on Serbia for internal governance;
   • The country continues to exist with two entities, which do not recognize each other.

III. Escalation (Kosovo as a failed state, governed by corruption and mafia groups) prolonged institutional crisis:
   • further deterioration of the economy;
• entry point for radical Islam and recruitment of young men to fight for ISIS;
• Corruption and possible further criminalization of the North.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


KOSOVO-SERBIA: CARRYING OUT NORMALIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Key political dynamics developed in the Western Balkans (WB) during the last years. The declaration of independence in Kosovo ended the violent break-up of former Yugoslavia, with relevant issues being discussed at the political and diplomatic level. The dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia was of crucial importance not only due to Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo’s statehood but also because the dialogue would be in the interest of the citizens, be it of Kosovar Albanian or Serbs. As a result, the re-opening of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia in September 2010, marked the first step by the European Union (EU) to bring the parties to the table. In this presentation I argue that the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia brought a light to the end of the tunnel – yet we are still not certain where the light really comes from. Once cannot still know whether the light is artificially brought or if it really represents the future relations.

In general terms, it is right and understandable to consider that the Albanian and Serbian relations in the Balkans are of crucial importance to build and maintain stability in the region. The open issues pertaining the Albanians and Serbs represents the most challenging puzzle in the jigsaw of stability by which a final compromise line would finally end hostilities. The so called “historic agreement” that has been reached on the 19th of April 2013 between the prime ministers of Kosovo and Serbia did not touch upon the main problem, because both parties did not recognize the role and position of each other in the region. It is of crucial importance for the both parties to admit that the Serbs need to recognise the equal role of the Albanian component, hence Kosovo, whereas Albanians in general and especially those in Kosovo need to understand the position and the importance of Serbia in the region.

Furthermore quite often the parties tend to forget or disregard the main purpose of the dialogue. It is widely known that the ultimate aim of the talks is EU mem-
bership for both countries; however the concept of regional co-operation does not seem to exist in the southern part of the Balkans. This does raise the question: who co-operates and what are the main fronts of co-operation in the region? It is interesting to see that, despite the general increase of regional co-operation among other countries, only the lowest level of co-operation is present in the southern part of the Western Balkans. A closer observation of the data and statistics shows that there is a clear division between the Albanian sphere and former Yugoslav Sphere, meaning that serious problems are still present in the countries such as: Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia (FYROM). Clearly, Kosovo does also serve as a connecting bridge between Serbia and Albania. Thus, the Kosovo-Serbia agreement is crucial also in terms of the potential co-operation between Albania and Serbia. In fact, potential co-operation between Albania and Serbia develops only through Kosovo and only in these situations, the true regional purpose of the talks takes a larger dimension rather than the bilateral one we are used to see in the media and political discussion.

CO-OPERATION STARTED, BUT WHO COOPERATES?

While normalization of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia has hardly been seen on the horizon, slight progress has been witnessed so far. There is a good normalization between political elites despite the fact that it is quite limited and remains away from the public eye. They meet frequently and sometimes during occasions about which the public is not aware of. Based on the abovementioned facts and events one can simply agree that the primary goal of bringing the political elites to one place and discussing on the table has been successfully reached.

The concept of co-operation, however, does not involve political elites only. Another indispensable factor in this process is represented indeed by civil society organizations. We have to admit that there is limited co-operation at the civil society level. However, there are numerous projects being implemented jointly by Kosovar and Serbian think tanks. The trilateral project entitled: “Security Research Forum: Belgrade-Prishtina-Tirana” is a joint platform of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP), the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) and the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM). The contribution of the three organisations lays down the foundation for a stronger and wider future co-operation among CSOs (Civil Society Organization) in the region. It is truly regrettable to observe that there is a weak academic co-operation between Kosovo and Serbia, and diplomas issues by each country are hardly recognized in the other country, not to mention other levels of deeper academic co-operation. The academic co-operation and mobility would involve young students to think differently and listen in a perspective of “otherness”.
Despite frequent brushes with crises and obstacles in the general collaboration between Kosovo and Serbia, it is important to mention that there is very good business co-operation. And here I tend to make a correlation with Cyprus where there is an extremely limited co-operation between Turkish and Greek communities and where business is not an exception. Of course, Cyprus should not be considered as an example due to the different contexts and, most importantly, due to the long-standing problems. However, it could serve as a reference in showing an even more troubling lack of co-operation in a country where part of the territory is an EU member state.

I should not forget to highlight that there is very good co-operation between criminals from both sides. This is particularly the case with the northern part of Kosovo, a hardly controlled territory which became one of the most convenient spots for organized crime groups – both Serbian and Kosovar – from which to operate and develop illegal activities.

Being all actors extremely occupied with political elites and more highly political issues, the most important factor in this process has been overshadowed and left behind quite often. Citizens of both countries have been ignored by all parties involved in the process, leaving almost no room for co-operation. The problem is that there is no co-operation between the citizens whilst mobility, especially among youth, is nonexistent. In particular, the prejudices among the youth are very acute. Truly, this is a result of the lack of mobility. The youth tend to construct their prejudices on the basis of what other age groups have transmitted, and not always on the basis of their experiences. In a survey the KCSS conducted in 2013, it appears that only a small percentage of young Kosovars (KSB, 2013) travel to Serbia, and most of those who went there were directed to the Presevo Valley or other Albanian inhabited areas, mostly for the purpose of visiting their relatives or friends living on the other side of the border.

While the older Albanian generation - regardless of the difficult past - can draw a difference between “a bad and a good Serb”, this is unfortunately not the case with the younger generation. This mainly happens because existing prejudices prevailed among the younger generations as result of lack of mobility and information.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXISTING AGREEMENTS

The light at the end of the tunnel mentioned at the very beginning of this paper partially refers to the benefits that citizens of both countries are somehow getting from the freedom of movement, trade and capital. Having in mind that mobility directly affects the lives of all people from both countries, the governments of
Kosovo and Serbia agreed upon a set of rules and standards in July 2011. On the verge of a political settlement, the most laudable and applauded agreement between Kosovo and Serbia appears to be the so-called “first normalization agreement” reached in April 2013. This agreement was highly welcomed among the political elite in Kosovo which was hoping to regain control over the northern part of Kosovo after almost 15 years of the “status-quo”.

The focal point of this agreement are the modalities and regulations on how to dismantle Serb parallel structures and their integration within Kosovo’s institutional structure. In particular the agreement foresees the full integration of the Serbian community within Kosovo’s justice, police, and other public services. Needless to say, there is some progress in terms of dismantling the Serbian security institutions in Kosovo. Former members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia who happened to be present in the northern part of Kosovo are slowly being integrated into the Kosovo Police.

The problem still remains with the so-called civil protection units. Those units continue operating as separate structures of civil protection on the basis of the Law on Defence of Serbia and following the tradition of territorial defence - a concept which was typical of Yugoslavia. Serbia silently refuses to dismantle these units while also benefiting from the loopholes in the Brussels agreement where there was no explicit reference to these units.

Apart from the above mentioned issues, the most sensitive issue regards Kosovo’s path to regional security initiatives. Out of almost 40 initiatives, Kosovo manages to have access to only four security initiatives. Again, going back to the agreement signed between Kosovo and Serbia that explicitly mentions that neither of the parties should block the other, specifically after the Kosovo Government accepted the “footnote agreement” in which Kosovo instead of the title “Kosovo – UNMIK” will be presented as Kosovo*.

The footnote states, “This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence”. Yet, despite this rather painful “consensus”, exclusion still happens. For example, Kosovo is being blocked by Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Actually, Bosnia is frequently used as a satellite of Serbia in blocking Kosovo on the basis of its sovereign right system which causes diplomatic problems due to the influence of the Republika Srpska autonomous region. So far, Kosovo became part of the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC) but is not benefiting from its programmes, especially in security and justice affairs, and has been hardly represented as a member with full rights in other regional security initiatives.
THE ROLE OF THE EU AS DIALOGUE FACILITATOR

In principle, the EU played a role as a global soft power actor because it managed to bring the parties to the table and reach a certain number of agreements aiming at normalising the situation. So far EU has been able to cajole both Kosovo and Serbia into the negotiations as a trade-off for the European integration process. The EU has made it clear and made both parties aware that they need to reach an agreement aiming at reaching a long-lasting peace and stability in the region. Thus, we can discern a tendency from the EU side to make a trade-off between stability and the rule of law in our countries. The situation is thus very different from the times when former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, asked “whom should I call in Europe if I want to talk on European issues”; the telephone number is the EU External Action Service (EEAS), a body which is gradually becoming the real address to be called.

Having in mind that the EU has been constantly emphasizing “the carrot and stick” approach towards Kosovo and Serbia, there is a tendency by using this type of conditionality to suspend the political judgment for the time being and concentrate only on the dialogue’s achievements, without considering other more technical aspects as well as internal conditionality. This is rather problematic because it appears that the conditionality over the fight against corruption and organised crime is overshadowed by the progress in dialogue.

On the other hand both parties and the EU as a dialogue facilitator failed to ensure a bottom-up approach when dealing with such sensitive issues. The agenda has not been driven by the targeted country – in this case Kosovo. Serbs in the north and their interests were not included and taken into consideration in the dialogue, because Belgrade is acting on their behalf. Until representatives of the Serbs in Kosovo will not be directly involved in the discussion, we will not be able to declare we are using a bottom-up approach in achieving the solution, and therefore this is the cause dis-satisfaction and resistance by Serbian Kosovars towards this agreement.

Clearly, the dialogue and agreements derived from this are therefore purely driven by the EU agenda, and the mission that this structure has been globally taking in promoting mediation and dialogue in the past 20 years. Hence, quite often the negotiations are seen only through the prism of regional security and stability, as a mechanism to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia in order to fulfil a direct EU effort on peace mediation in the Balkans, rather than as an effort at internally developing these countries.
Session 3

NATO AND EUROPE: THE STATE OF THE INTEGRATION
THE EU: WIDER AND DEEPER WITH THE BALKANS. BREAKING THE CHAINS OF WEARINESS

This contribution examines some facets and phases of the EU in the past twenty-five years. The post-1945 system is today overcome and a new world order is about to emerge. This new—quite explosive—background doesn’t signal the end of the EU, but evidences that its core features must be redesigned and receive a broad popular support. Retooling, a policy of mere adjustments will not do it; a long-term vision coping with the challenges of the twenty-first century is now urgently needed. This could only take the shape of new treaty.

Against this background, the EU’s further enlargement must take a new profile. First, the overemphasised trade-off between widening and deepening is here deconstructed: deepening and widening go hand in hand. Second, enlargement needs to be a planned political goal not a confuse mixture of technical criteria which get ever harder to meet. Third, the “regatta principle”—counterproductive and lacking results—should be replaced an innovative and redesigned “caravan approach”. Fourth, a conditionality package should be prioritised and, as for previous candidates, a proactive handling of the exemptive differentiation and transitional arrangements should be introduced. Last but not least, the EU must accept that open questions will be solved only in the framework of the EU and will thus request an “integration follow-up” mechanism targeting these issues.

1. THE EU: WITH DIVIDES OR FLEXIBILITY?

To state the obvious, the last twenty-five years were shaped by a global democratic expansion coined by Huntington as the “third wave of democratisation”,¹ the reunification of Germany, the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the progressive emergence of the European Union (EU) through various rounds of enlargement.

The 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall symbolised the triumph of democracy and of a reunited Europe—noteworthy, by that time nobody questioned the principle of the EU enlargement. Nevertheless, the general post–1989 enthusiasm was short-lived. The very idea of “spreading democracy” became filtered through more realistic lenses. It became obvious to acknowledge different pace of democratisation: rapid democratic consolidation being the exception, the longer-time perspective being unavoidable in most cases—especially for less-developed lower-income countries. As for the EU integration, it became over the years a longer and more demanding process. Noteworthy, despite the most favourable conditions (as compared to those faced in the 2010s by the Balkan candidate countries), Central and Eastern European candidate members had to wait until 2004—thus 15 years after 1989—becoming full-fledged EU member.

Against the background of the then forthcoming 2004 “big bang enlargement”, this idea of pace was transposed to the EU integration process in order to solve its wider deeper trade-off. In the framework of a two- or multi-speed Europe, a “core Europe” would bring together a “progressive” group of states developing “enhanced collaboration” and “driving” the union. However, expected facilitated consensus and gains in efficiency were outbalanced, first by institutional hurdles; second, by already existing tensions between centre and periphery, between wealthy (donor) and poor (recipient) countries; and, third, by the risk to build a second-class membership which would weaken the EU’s internal cohesion and renew the East–West divide.

Meanwhile the union self-imposed various divides: between the 17 member states of the Eurozone and the 11 member states left outside; between 23 member states applying the Schengen agreement and those 5 which do not belong to (UK, Ireland, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia). Further, two member states—Romania and Bulgaria—are under the “Cooperation and Verification Mechanism” since they joined the EU in 2007. Last but not least, in relation to the assertion of a particular fiscal discipline within an austerity regime, EU’s divide switches from a West–East into a North–South one. Against the background of a divided EU, how do you expand?

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4 The mechanism of “enhanced cooperation” was first mentioned by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and confirmed by the Nice Treaty (2001).
6 See the bi-annual progress reports at ec.europa.eu/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm (accessed on 12 August 2014).
We may see it from a slightly different perspective. The EU is indeed moving closer to a union à la carte driven by a variable geometry–approach in order to confront its increased heterogeneity. Such an approach will most probably be adopted in the field of the European public policy in order to introduce some flexibility for different member states–especially the UK that asks for the retransfer of certain competencies. In the field of foreign policy and security matters, ad hoc groups already implement the same strategy: new alliances emerge which effectively change the rules without changing the Treaty. This illustrates the trend–of course reinforced by the successive rounds of enlargement–towards increased heterogeneity in the EU and the inexorable shift towards a more flexible union.

This partly fits with Larry Diamond’s perspective focusing on multi-layered and nonlinear processes “which often involves progress on some fronts and regression or setbacks followed by increments of progress”.7 Thereafter new keywords surfaced such as “democratic consolidation”, “continued democratic development” and “invigoration of democracy”. Acknowledging the widening gap between democratic form and substance, “low-intensity democracy”, “poor democracy” and similar terms emerged to describe “weak” and “failed” states. Guillermo O’Donnell introduced the more precise notion of “delegative democracy” referring to countries having the formal constitutional structures of democracy, but being institutionally hollow and fragile.8 Understandably the question rose if the Third Wave was over.9 If not a reverse wave of democratisation, we are currently facing stagnation or, to put it optimistically, stability. How do these terms cope with our focus?

First, related to the way the EU currently is organised: the informal extension of the competencies of the Commission and the Council (the later acting as law–maker and as executive), the still weak Parliament and the poorly Europeanised parties make clear that the EU is only insufficiently democratised. Second, populist setbacks may be observed in Central Europe where democratic institutional foundations turn out to be fragile and lack firm social foundation–here the term consolidation may apply.10 Third, looking especially to Bosnia’s and Kosovo’s bad performances and high level in corruption, the notion of weak and/or failed states is often used. Is the union strong and flexible enough to integrate the later?

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In spite of all welcome criticism, both Southern and Central Europe—of course not (yet) the Balkans\textsuperscript{11}—can be considered as a “third wave success story”.\textsuperscript{12} There are of course obvious differences, first, between the regimes transition in Southern and in Central-Eastern Europe, and second, within the 27 post-communist countries themselves, notably between the different subregions: respectively the post-communist, the post-Yugoslav and the post-Soviet countries.\textsuperscript{13} We may highlight the broader reach of the transition process in Central Europe involving politics, economic, social life, nation- and state-buildings; and, for the post-Yugoslav area, a transition process of similar magnitude but through wars (\textit{transition guerrière}) and from federalism to new nation-states. Of course, the strategic and security dimensions were here key. The “security void” after 1989 explains why the NATO expansion proceeded faster than that one of the EU—even if joining the EU was the ultimate goal.\textsuperscript{14}

After the post-1989 good weather, 2014 faced a profound climate change with Russia’s destabilising strategy: the annexation of Crimea was promptly followed by Moscow’s interference in eastern Ukraine, where the Russian federation fo-mented instability, armed separatists and intervened military. More globally, the disjunction between conventional arms and nuclear weapons—providing the firsts a new strategic use—and the emergence of cyberwarfare characterise possibly a “new Cold War” era. How welcome Germany’s new assertive policy may be, as well as an increased commitment by some European countries as Italy, France and Poland, the EU’s response—mostly economic sanctions—was far too slow and not incisive enough. Considering this and the weakness of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the almost immediate NATO expansion to Central European countries in the early 1990s provides today the only reliable security umbrella.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{13} Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Eds.), Democracy after Communism, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002; see especially the chapters by Ghia Nodia (pp. 5–17) and Valerie Bunce (pp. 18–32).
\textsuperscript{15} In the wake of the NATO Summit of September 2014, the NATO enhanced its capacities in Central Europe and the Baltics with the establishment of a so-called spearhead force and, possibly, of a new military base in Szczecin (Poland)—where the NATO troop would stay close to the facilities of the Multinational Corps Northeast (staffed with German, Danish and Polish divisions). Simultaneously, the US launched a European Reassurance Initiative increasing its military presence in Europe and improving military infrastructure to allow for greater responsiveness.
2. BREAKING THE CHAINS OF WEARINESS: A NEW EU IN A NEW WORLD ORDER

These twenty-five years (1989–2014) should thus not be seen as a continuum. First, the 1989–2004 period may be seen positively, if focusing on the construction of the EU including the successful introduction of the euro and the 1995 and 2004 waves of enlargement. Second, the 2005 French and Dutch rejection of the draft treaty establishing a constitution for Europe, the European Council’s painful difficulties to agree on the EU budget for 2007–2013, last but not least the global economic crisis marked a turning point confronting the EU with a crisis of unprecedented seriousness. Third, in the meantime nationalism re-emerges all-over and weakens the multilateral institutions and the EU. As for the later, particularly worrying is the increase presence, now even in the EU parliament, of movements opposing to what the EU stands for—fundamental values (rule of law, human dignity and human rights), solidarity between peoples and nations, shared sovereignty and institutions. Declining legitimacy and rising of nationalism combined with right wing sovereigntism go hand in hand—both increasing political instability and tensions.

To complete this overview we may briefly complete the broader picture: Asia—not only China—becomes a new strategic pole but unwilling or unable to take position on concrete issues as the Syrian and Ukrainian ones. Further, the instruments of the international order—as the UN and other intergovernmental bodies—seem more and more unable to deal with transnational security and climate issues. Last but not least, the US is opting—at least temporary—for fall-back positions.

Without doubt, the post-1945 system is now overcome and a new world order is about to emerge: multipolar, bipolar—but in a new way—, apolar or unstructured, an anarchy under control? At this stage it is hard to be more precise. For sure, the economics globalisation is strongly contrasted by the fragmentation and the increased heterogeneity of the political sphere. As Habermas puts it: While nation-states

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17 Of course, the French and Dutch votes did not produce the crisis, they simply brought it to the surface. As pointed out by Laurent Cohen-Tanugi: “it was the economic, social, and political shortcomings of the existing EU that brought about the rejection of the treaty, not the other way around”; Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, “The End of Europe?”, Foreign Affairs, 6 (2005) 84, pp. 55–67.
are seen by most of their citizens as the only collective entities that act effectively with some legitimacy, they don’t face the reality that precisely state-nations “have become more and more entangled in functional contexts which transcend national borders”.  

Nicole Gnesotto summarises the key security issues in an unstable world:

**Le leadership américain est absent, l’exemplarité européenne est révolue, l’autorité de l’ONU est empêchée, et le dynamisme des puissances émergentes, bien que réel, reste autocentré. D’où la litanie des paradoxes stratégiques, plus faciles à énoncer qu’à résoudre : un monde plus violent mais une communauté internationale plus impuissante. Un contexte plus instable mais une sécurité internationale moins régulée. Des extrémités plus actifs, des démocraties plus incertaines. C’est devant ces défis que la volonté d’impuissance collective des Européens apparaît comme le plus formidable gâchis politique de ce début de XXIe siècle.**

Simone Weil’s premonitory words may be here recalled as they receive a new meaning:

*If we do not undertake a serious effort of analysis, one day sooner or later we may well find ourselves at war and powerless not only to act but even to make judgments.*

As well as Husserl’s 1935 Vienna lecture-inviting to break the chains of weariness:

*There are only two escapes from the crisis of European existence: the downfall of Europe in its estrangement from its own rational sense of life, its fall into hostility toward the spirit and into barbarity; or the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy through that heroism of reason that overcomes naturalism once and for all. Europe’s greatest danger is weariness.*

The new explosive background doesn’t signal of course the end of the EU, but evidences that its cores features—such as the competition policy, the freedom-of-movement rules, the Euro and the EU’s monetary policy—must be rede-

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signed and receive a broad popular support. The quite unproductive “period of reflection” is over: retooling, a policy of mere adjustments, will not do it, a long-term vision coping with the challenges of the twenty-first century is now urgently needed.

If not a new European treaty, the existing ones need to be utterly revised: first, a truly monetary union—effectively coordinating the economic policies of the member states—must address the structural defects of monetary union; second, a nation-state-based and democratically legitimised EU—as a transnational community and multilevel governance meeting democratic benchmarks of legitimation—seems to be the only model enabling to overcome the false alternative between nation state and European federal state.\(^\text{24}\) As Habermas highlights, in a federation without a state, shared—thus not superimposed—sovereignty at the EU level and state sovereignty are not two levels competing for control over centralized authority but distinct and at the same time interweaved levels. As the nation states continue to uphold their constitutional role as guarantors of law and freedom, there is no loss of legitimacy involved in establishing a political order beyond the nation state.\(^\text{25}\) Instead of an absolutely unrealistic supranational, such a transnational option—admittedly certainly complex to introduce—offers the only credible way to settle a new political framework.

### 3. ENLARGEMENT: WIDER OR/AND DEEPER?

After more than 50 years of European integration, the EU has to tackle a crisis of performance and a crisis of identity. People worry more about EU’s unfulfilled economic and social promise,\(^\text{26}\) less about the EU’s inability to play a bigger role on the world scene, and only marginally about “excessive expansion”. Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge that the enlarged EU is perceived as increasingly ineffective. The trust in the enlargement policy significantly declined in EU member states—including in traditionally pro-enlargement countries—and in candidates countries as well.\(^\text{27}\) More than frustration, this disenchantment expresses the rather rational

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\(^{24}\) One key argument, based on the distinction between popular and state sovereignty, is made by Habermas: “restricting national sovereignty by transferring sovereign rights to the supranational authorities by no means necessarily comes at the cost of disenfranchising democratic citizens”, Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union, p. 18.

\(^{25}\) Such a “stateless EU”, as a non-state polity, may be seen as a response to the problem of nationalism and international relations; see Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union.

\(^{26}\) We may remember that the 2000 Lisbon agenda promised for the next decade to turn the EU into “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth, with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm).

\(^{27}\) See the Standard Eurobarometer for 2013 (ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm); see Sara B. Holbot, “Ever Closer or ever Wider? Public Attitudes Towards further Enlargement and Integration in the European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, 21 (2014) 5,
opinion that a 28-member union is hardly workable in the actual loosely connected network of transnational regimes.28

Nonetheless symptoms of the EU’s crisis should not be taken for its causes. It is not the enlargement per se which burdens the future deepening of the EU, but the way it was planned—the then 15-member union having been unable to achieve the necessary institutional reforms for the further enlargement waves. In other words, while the last round of enlargement was conducted without institutional reform that would have strengthened both EU institutions and EU’s cohesion, the EU cannot ignore them now.

Against this background, the EU’s deepening-supranational centralisation—and its further enlargement-expansion of membership—may hardly be conceived as business as usual. While the context factor—highlighting the increasing politicisation of the integration process—of course matters, the misleading alternative horizontality (widening) vs. verticality (deepening) must be discussed as such. As both aspects are intertwined, it would be wrong to consider them separately—what is at stake is their interaction.

In the past years many scholars and politicians overemphasised the trade-off between widening and deepening, advocating the first would obstruct the second. But the long and winding road of the EU demonstrates the contrary: deepening and widening go hand in hand. Enlargement constantly affected the EU’s own functioning, producing systematic deepening of supranational policy-making capacities. As Eva Eidbreder pinpoints:

_Enlargement extended the policy agenda beyond the traditional pool of EU policies to political realms in which the old member states had not seen the need to pool competences but felt pressured to introduce safeguards for the incoming members. Consequently, enlargement served as a powerful catalyst of policy-generated integration._29

This is consistent with the research conducted by Kelemen, Menon and Slapin. Based on a theoretical model and empirical evidence, these authors suggest that widening facilitate deepening:

_It does so, first, by generating legislative gridlock that in turn increases the room for manoeuvre of supranational administrative and judicial actors who exploit their discre-

664–680.
tion to pursue their preferences for deeper integration. Secondly, because it encourages legislative bottlenecks, enlargement creates functional pressures for institutional reform that eventually facilitate deepening.30

The same authors observed that the successive enlargements have enhanced the centrality of the EU system, notably strengthening EU’s judicial system and empowering meaningfully—albeit with poor legitimacy—the Commission’s coordination and brokerage role.

Beyond the above-mentioned trade-off, the past six rounds of enlargement illustrate also “differentiated integration”—the Eurozone and Schengen area exemplify this. Further, weaker candidates benefited in the past rounds of enlargement of preferential treatment—for example receiving more time in order to adopt the acquis.31 As highlighted by Schimmelfennig: “the EU uses differentiated integration as an instrument to smooth the enlargement process and to reduce the costs of enlargement for both old and new member states.”32

What is at stake is thus not the widening vs. deepening, but the homogeneity vs. heterogeneity alternative—the later favouring deeper cooperation inside the EU.33 To sum-up: recent researches deconstruct the false alternative widening vs. deepening and highlight the key role of heterogeneity, thus flexibility. The remaining challenges are, first, to increase legitimacy of EU’s procedure in the framework of a new treaty (see above section 2) and, second, to review the enlargement process.

4. ENLARGEMENT: WHO, WHEN AND HOW

4.1. Who

Excepted Iceland, no other enlargement is on the table as the one of the Balkans. Albania became candidate in 2014; Macedonia in 2005—but both countries are miles away from opening accession talks; Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded its negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) in 2008—but this agreement is still not in force; Serbia started formally the accession negotiations in January 2014; Kosovo started negotiating the SAA in late 2012. Turkey,

32 Schimmelfennig, “EU Enlargement and Differentiated Integration”, p. 695.
33 An issue discussed more in details by Christina J. Schneider, “Domestic Politics und the Widen-

negotiating since 2005, has not yet opened half its negotiation. To sum up, all these countries are in the slow lane.

In spite of modest results and serious shortcomings, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo where the EU is part of the problem, substantial progress in modernisation and democratisation have been achieved since the 1990s. Compare to Afghanistan and Iraq, the Balkans stands for an example of successful post-conflict reconstruction—note-worthy: the EU was unable to solve Macedonia’s name dispute, the Kosovo status and the Bosnian conundrum. Nevertheless: the perspective of accession, the major stability anchor for all countries, remains the most efficient incentive for the on-going post-communism transition and reform process. In the framework of the above-mentioned already existing trend towards a flexible and more heterogeneous EU, some five additional new incomers—thus Turkey here not included—will not affect the on-going process of (de)centralisation—they will neither overburden the “absorption capacities” of the EU.34

If we could acknowledge in past years the proactive presence of Turkey, China and Russia, they do not represent a credible alternative for the Western Balkans.35 But if the EU integration perspective doesn’t gain in credibility, major setbacks cannot be excluded. A halt in transition and democratisation processes could well introduce a vicious circle and lead to the consolidation of clientelist and semi-authoritarian regimes—most probably increasing China’s and Russia’s influence in the region. In this case the EU membership would become a “dead deal”.

4.2. When?

After the 2004 “big bang” enlargement, distinguished experts and politicians extended the “pause for reflexion” on the Treaty to the enlargement process. Soon the pause became an “enlargement fatigue”. Ten years after, things are going from bad to worse: while presenting officially the political guidelines for the next commission on July 15th, the new president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, mentioned clearly a “break”:

The EU needs to take a break from enlargement so that we can consolidate what has been achieved among the 28. This is why, under my Presidency of the Commission, ongoing negotiations will continue, and notably the Western Balkans will need to keep a European perspective, but no further enlargement will take place over the next five years.36 But what does this mean? Anyhow the most advance

36 Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Demo-
candidate countries, Montenegro and Serbia are not likely to join before 2020, for the remaining candidates 2030. This means some 20, respectively 30 years since the launch of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 1999. It is not clear if Juncker’s statement refers to this timetable or if he is adding further 5 years—thus willing to further slowdown enlargement. If so, we would face a never-ending negotiations scenario that might seriously affect the reform process in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{37}

The fact that Directorate General for Enlargement has been renamed European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations tends to confirm this scenario. For sure the 2014–2019 Juncker Commission is not looking out, but in. While for some candidate countries the new EU priorities strike a blow, they may be welcome by those in the region and in different European capitals who only seemingly supported the accession process and have—albeit different—interests to further preserve their private economic interest and/or political power.

No appetite anymore? Curiously, on the very same day when Juncker presented his political guidelines, German Chancellor Angela Merkel—while meeting in Dubrovnik the Presidents of Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia—sent a quite different message stating that, provided the criteria and treaties are respected, the (not yet EU member states) countries from the Balkans have a “clear prospect” of joining the EU.\textsuperscript{38} Merkel emphasised that: “The countries of the region that have gathered here are on the way to becoming EU members and we can say that all of them already completed a big part of the journey”.\textsuperscript{39} Once again, the EU doesn’t speak with one voice and the signals are confusing for people in Europe and for those willing to join the EU.

The Dubrovnik gathering was followed by a conference organised in Berlin on 28 August 2014. Under the motto “Through trade, investment and regional cooperation to new dynamics”, heads of government, foreign ministers and economic ministers of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Slovenia and Serbia attended the conference. The follow-up conferences are supposed to be organised each year until 2018 and assess progress in the field of regional economic cooperation, resolving outstanding bilateral and internal issues.\textsuperscript{40} No word how. Berlin was just another additional—a mostly disappoint-

\textsuperscript{37} See the four scenarios discussed by the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, The Unfulfilled Promise: Completing the Balkan Enlargement, Belgrade and Graz: European Fund for the Balkans and Centre for Southeast European Studies, 2014.

\textsuperscript{38} As reported by Deutsche Welle and AFP on 16 July 2014. Greece became the first Balkan country to join the EU in 1981, Slovenia the second one in 2004, and Croatia the third one in 2013.

\textsuperscript{39} As reported by Sven Milekić for Balkan Insight (www.balkaninsight.com).

\textsuperscript{40} From the “Final Declaration by the Chair of the Conference on the Western Balkans”, Berlin, 28
ing-conference. Nevertheless, Germany, the most important trade partner for the Balkan region, seems to become the stakeholder willing to push the integration forward. But how?

4.3. How not

The EU’s current enlargement strategy is based on the “regatta principle” that clearly prioritises the technical side of the accession process and undermines its political dimension: each country implements the *acquis* individually and its integration into the EU progresses in accordance with its reform milestones. In other words, each country joins the union at a different point in time. Many leaders in the region welcomed this approach; beyond the mostly empty rhetoric on regional cooperation, all are looking separately to Brussels, not taking care about their neighbours. This of course weakens the bargaining power of the region’s states.

While some technical arguments indeed speak in favour of this approach, it stands nevertheless in contradiction with the EU’s own regional policy, with the fact that regional cooperation is an additional conditionality imposed to the Balkan candidate countries. Nor does it fit with the historic heritage made of a shared past followed by wars and now mutual suspicion. While some technical arguments indeed speak in favour of this approach, it stands nevertheless in contradiction with the EU’s own regional policy, with the fact that regional cooperation is an additional conditionality imposed to the Balkan candidate countries. Nor does it fit with the historic heritage made of a shared past followed by wars and now mutual suspicion. It also neglect the fact that the previous successful rounds of enlargement were all “group driven” and successful. Notably the regional solidarity illustrated by the Višegrad four stands as a model of effective regional cooperation and integration processes that could inspire the Balkans. Especially inasmuch each Balkan country is facing serious bilateral problems that still hamper the bilateral and multilateral cooperation and may seriously obstruct the accession process once in its final stage. Noteworthy various EU member states as Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Romania and Slovenia are involved-countries that might receive support from the anti-enlargement lobby in the EU.

While the accession process is supposed to be equal for all candidates, the Balkan countries have to fulfil a set of additional conditions—notably the “Copenhagen Plus” criteria—and experiment a fare more rigorous union in the way it monitors the “enhances conditionality”. More than it was the case with the past rounds, the regatta approach favours single members blocking or delaying decisions on enlargement. All this considerably slows down the enlargement and gives the im-

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August 2014 (www.bundesregierung.de).


pression that the Balkans do not race with the same rules.

Last but not least. After all, let’s assume in spite of common sense, the regatta race would have been the right way. Where are the results after 15 years? Game over.

4.4. So how?

We argued for serious reforms inside the EU that would include a constructive deepening–widening process (section 2 above). Only such a process could in our view reload and legitimise the enlargement. It would also provide the EU the opportunity to recommit to the region with some credibility. A new treaty could possibility envision integrating the candidate countries in some EU structures–observer status in the EU Council and Parliament, participant status in some EU programme as Erasmus. The first impact in the Balkans would be restoring the incentives to reform and avoiding any unnecessary postponement of the accession. To be more assertive doesn’t mean to implement a bulldozer style. Timing matters: a clear and realistic timetable would be a considerable step in forward.

The second consequence of this approach would be developing a regional qualitative approach focusing on the—not merely technical but essentially-political dimension of the integration process. Past candidate countries, not only Romania and Bulgaria, entered more rapidly than their reform progress report would have allowed because of the successful exertion of political influence. All past candidates countries benefited of “exemptive differentiation” and/or “transitional arrangements”\(^{43}\), these should also apply in a specific manner to the different new incomers and ease their path to Brussels.\(^{44}\)

Further, the countries should meet the criteria fixed by the conditionality package prior to membership, not to talks. A conditionality set should be prioritised focusing on national convergence strategies (targeting various issues, notably: public administration, fiscal consolidation, improvement of productivity, reform of education). A proactive handling of the exemptive differentiation and transitional arrangements—including extensive assistance measures—should be adopted for issues requesting more administrative competencies and capacity building. As for still open questions (border, status, constitution—what Veton Surroi calls the

\(^{43}\) “Exemptive differentiation’ refers to those transitional arrangements that favour the new member states by postponing undesired obligations of membership such as environmental or safety standards. In contrast, transitional arrangements causing ‘discriminatory differentiation’ exclude the new member states temporarily from desired rights and benefits of EU membership such as passport-free travel or subsidies from the EU budget”. Schimmelfennig, “EU Enlargement and Differentiated Integration”, p. 682.

“unfinished states”): the EU must consider the alternative solving them in the framework of the EU. Accordingly, an “integration follow-up” mechanism targeting these issues should be set-up.

Third, we clearly advocate a single round-a caravan instead of the regatta approach. Thus, all countries would negotiate simultaneously for membership. In this way the shortcomings of the later would be avoided. This would also impeach the split of the candidate group in one group (of 2 countries) moving steadily forward, while the prospects for the slower candidates would be bleak-leading most probably towards the abandonment of the accession. Such a caravan approach would also reinvigorate the accession process and create a truly new regional dynamic increasing the bargaining power of the candidate countries. Cross-border regional projects should receive more attention and be supported by the European Investment Bank (EIB). Enhanced and effective regional collaboration could create a virtuous circle of transformation and integration. Regional cooperation not limited to the Balkan states, but involving Central Europe and, in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Baltic area.\(^{45}\)

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The debate on Western Balkans and the future of security in the whole European region is quite important and definitely timely. The European Union was born as a security project about peace and reconciliation after the Second World War.

The region today makes for an excellent case of demonstration of the transforming power of the European Union. After the bloody conflicts that went hand in hand with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the consequent fall of authoritarian and dictatorship regimes, the EU is essentially contributing in the reconstruction of the states, of the democratic societies as well as in the economic development. Keeping alive the perspective of European integration is truly indispensable for the de-securitization process, for building peace and reaching reconciliation in the Balkans.

This becomes even more important in the light of the recent dramatic developments that can potentially influence the politics of enlargement in the negative way. This is unfortunate since enlargement has been one of the most successful if not the most successful policies of the EU.

There are at least three major developments that have the power to shape the EU enlargement policy in the Balkans.

First of all, the economic crisis, which hit severely most of the European countries, has impacted on a number of European policies, among which and to a large degree the enlargement policy. Second, the security crisis in Ukraine is causing implications for the European Union as one of the key player in world politics. Third, the rise of the Islamist State in Syria and Iraq and more generally all the happenings in the Middle East, pose new security threats and take Europe in-
evitably away from more local perspectives. Those conditions translate into an enlargement fatigue.

In concrete terms, the support for the enlargement policy of the EU has fallen even in those countries where support has been previously considerable such as the case of Italy and Spain. At the same time the declining approach towards seeing new member states in the European family has climbed steeply in those countries where even, in the past there, has been a general and constant reluctant reaction towards enlargement.

The President of the European Commission, Juncker, stating that there shall be no enlargement in the next five years, might have also raised some serious questions on the perspective of the enlargement policy in the Balkans.

The argument that I would like to discuss is that the process of European integration has always been and will always be very determining - first and foremost - for the de-securitization process of inter-state relations in the Balkans as well as similarly essential for the process of state building and consolidation. Hence keeping the hope of the European perspective for these countries alive and continuing actively with the enlargement policy in this part of Europe is intractably linked with the future of security in the European dimension.

EU AND DE-SECURITIZATION OF THE BALKAN INTERSTATE RELATIONS

Talking about the Balkans, Chris Patten, the former Commissioner for EU External Relations, provided probably the most philosophical description of the Balkans’ technology of change when he said, almost a decade ago, that “In the Balkans, like the old English folk dance, it is often a case of two steps forward, one step back”.

While this logic of the technology of change almost prevailed in the region for more than a decade, the last developments may be a turning point whereby the steps towards the creation and well-functioning of a Balkan order are not necessarily accompanied by steps backwards.

For more than a year now, Croatia is a new EU member state and constitutes a good model to be followed by other aspiring countries. Albania after a relatively long journey, is finally an official candidate country for accession to the EU. Since 2009, both these countries are members of NATO, making an argument that when processes of European enlargement and NATO expansion in the Balkans are carried out parallel to each other they are mutually reinforcing.
The failure to reach an agreement over the name issue between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia hindered the latter to join NATO during the latest wave of the Alliance’s enlargement, together with Croatia and Albania. Even though the disagreements between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia seem entirely politicized, to the extent that they incite nationalistic feelings, it can be safely asserted that these disagreements are unlikely to become a security issue.

Montenegro and Serbia have opened negotiations for accession while it remains clear that the real progress of both these two, and of Macedonia, will depend heavily on the conduct and success of reforms to attain a functioning democracy as well as on their conduct of foreign policy in the international arena. It is very difficult to see how does the Serbian refusal to align with the foreign policy course of the EU, which consists of imposing sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea and influence in Ukraine, help its progress towards accession.

It is obvious that this dilemma does not consists only of economic or energy computations. Indeed, the confusion persists and becomes even more difficult in other relevant areas, such as the interpretation and explanation of joint military trainings on the border with Croatia, which is simultaneously a border with NATO.

Just as it was the case in the post-World War II, Europe was not so far from the today’s Balkan countries, needing the fulfilment of the reconciliation effort between countries and between peoples. The European Union through its enlargement policy is in reality the main and the stronger agent in both the de-securitization and reconciliation processes. This obvious and most importantly irreplaceable contribution is best observed in the relations between Albania and Serbia, Croatia and Serbia or the relations of all Balkans countries except Serbia with Kosovo.

Although there are no security issues between Albania and Serbia the relations between the two states after the declaration of independence of Kosovo are poor.

Albania is one of the countries that recognized Kosovo immediately after the declaration of independence. At present, Albania and Kosovo seem to be going through a phase of accommodation of the new state of affairs visible in their political and economic communications, but also at a societal level. Albania has offered a supportive political stance towards Kosovo, and the political elite of Tirana sees future relations with Kosovo as those between two future members of the European Union - as opposed to the mistaken theories that see Kosovo’s independence as a stepping stone towards Greater Albania.
However in the last 2-3 years one can observe a new dynamic emerging in the relations between Serbia and Albania. The economic relations, despite being modest due to the long-term lack of communication and isolation of Albania, have awoken the interest of both countries that have signed a considerable number of agreements. In the same period, trade and exchanges between businesses have increased and a number of competitive Serbian companies have expressed a clear interest in the Albanian investment market. In September of 2014 the air company Air Serbia started service towards Tirana, a development that is bringing a real facilitation towards people-to-people communication. Statistics reveal that the number of Serbian tourists choosing Albania, make up an increasing curve upwards. Political relations as well seem to be developing despite the static presence of the enemy myth, which revealed itself once again, in the hostile famous football match during and after which both countries slipped into a situation reminiscing of the distant past of tension and bad relations during the Cold War.

The visit of the Albanian Prime Minister Rama in Belgrade during this fall, the first at this level since 68 years, in fact demonstrated that the Myth of Enmity can be overcome.

The transforming power of the EU and the scope of its soft power in pushing forward at least the de-securitization process in the Balkans is best showcased in the example of the relations between Serbia and Kosovo. These relations were very much tense since the latter declared independence and have carried a critical potential to jeopardise the security and stability of the entire region.

In the five years immediately following the declaration of independence of Kosovo, the Serbia-Kosovo relations stood closer to a re-securitization process. Relations between Serbia and the new state of Kosovo were utterly and completely politicised. Despite the self-restraint that the governments of the two states demonstrated since the declaration of independence of Kosovo, their entirely politicised relations had very often been on the brink of a dangerous re-securitization process. Serbia still refuses to recognize the new state of Kosovo and has fully invested its diplomatic means in de-legitimizing Kosovo’s independence and hampering the process of international recognition. By continuing to claim, sovereignty over the new state of Kosovo, Serbia encouraged parallel institutions and structures, especially in the north of Kosovo where in several occasions the situation went very close to the eruption of a new conflict. On the other hand, Kosovo’s government and authorities have refrained themselves from the idea of establishing control and authority over the entire territory of the country, especially over the northern part. Furthermore, the international presence, the EULEX mission, has also not been able to establish its full control there.
In the last two years, the relations have witnessed a considerable shifting away from the tension. The direct negotiations of the two Prime Ministers under the encouragement and observation of the European Union have produced much needed results, which were quite unimaginable five years before the start of the dialogue. In April of 2014, Serbia and Kosovo reached a substantial agreement in Brussels.

Hence, some good and basic steps have been taken already in the process of de-securitization, which can serve as a foundation upon which to continue the efforts for reconciliation. Ultimately, reconciliation shall require more time and most importantly more communication between people of different nationalities in the Balkans.

**EU MEMBERSHIP – A DRIVING FORCE TO STATE-BUILDING PROCESS**

If we look at today’s Balkans from the state capacity perspective it is not difficult to realize that the state is weak in terms of its ability to provide for its citizens public goods like, security, a functioning legal system, a certain standards of educations, health care, infrastructure, roads, communications or other basic services that a state is supposed to provide.

The state in the Balkans is weak for complex reasons: the state tradition which does not go very far, the very low level of industrialization and economic development, the agrarian structures of national economies, the nature of the previous regime and economy including the conflicts and wars of the last decade, just to mention a few of them. With such a historical background, it is no wonder that the state building process is still under way in our region.

The state building process is one of the most important issues facing the world community because it presents the modern threat to national, regional and international security. The state building process actually is the core of the International Institutions/Organizations including EU.

During the last decade and especially after the end of the Kosovo war, the prospect of EU membership for the weak Balkan countries has been a real driving force of state building process. Compared to other major hotspots in the world map, the Balkans is one of the regions where state building has a realistic chance to succeed in the short-term through a unique combination of internal and external factors. Primary among these, is the presence of the European Union offering perspectives, guarantees and aid that virtuously feeds into the state-building cycle.

Analysing the dynamic of EU intervention in the Balkans after the first crisis of 1991, it is notable that the increasing role of EU actually concentrated on the core of the security problem in today’s Balkans, which is the weak state. In order
to overcome state weakness, the European Union – and other players too – are involved in day to day state-building process in countries like Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and other Balkan countries by promising them EU membership. The local elites are under the pressures to undertake the required reforms in order to meet EU criteria. Further, the EU conditionality serves as a basis for domestic legitimacy of the government in Balkan states. Failing to meet EU conditions means otherwise losing government legitimacy, which is an essential feature of weak states.

For the arguments mentioned above, keeping alive the EU perspective is crucially important for the future of the region.

The latest stage of affairs in the region suggests the need for a change in EU approach towards the region. A change in a positive direction would be to see the region not only as a threat but as an opportunity as well.

Further in the last four or five years the EU or some of its member states including Italy, have identified organized crime as a main security threat emanating from the Balkans. This is only partly true. The fact is that organized crime is not a security threat per se. The organized crime and other similar phenomena are simply the symptoms of state weakness in the Balkans including Albania. Consequently, the proper way to address issue like organized and crime corruption is to invest and strengthen state capacities in the Balkans.

Another observation for the idea how and why to make changes in EU approach toward the Balkans, is that Rule of Law is an essential features of EU model of state functioning. For more than one decade the EU have been investing in institutional building in Albania and other Balkan countries. Much was needed and thanks to EU assistance there is good progress in Albanian institutional capacities. However investing in Institution-building is in one way or another a top down approach. Probably time has come, if not to give up the top down approach, at least for a combined perspective: parallel with investment in institutional capacity the weak state in this region can be strengthened with strategic economic investment.

Let me be more clear by bringing here what a great thinker like Karl Popper reminds us.

In one of his latest interview he tells us that Gorbachev did something grotesque, ridiculous. Gorbachev established a stock exchange in Moscow. We have seen pictures of its formal opening with a great celebration. But the Stock exchange was really ridiculous simply because there was no stock and no money to buy stock at that time in Soviet Union. Albania did something similar and certainly more
ridiculous. It was the year 1992 when the government decided and established the Bursa in Tirana, which practically still is not working although it has offices, code of procedures like in other Western Countries.

What I am trying to say is not that the top down approach is not any more relevant in state building process. Rather the Balkan experience shows that a combined perspective of investment on institutional capacities and strategic economic investment would really help strengthening the state’s capacity in the Balkans.
WHY NATO?

When talking about NATO enlargement, either in the Western Balkans or anywhere else in Europe, there are few things one should keep in mind. NATO is often taken for granted and the provisions that are stated in the Washington Treaty, a cornerstone document of NATO though being really short, are often misinterpreted and confusing for some. This paper explains some of the most common obstacles in understanding NATO and its enlargement.

First, it should be clearly stated what NATO really stands for. NATO is an alliance of 28 members which voluntarily agreed on the conditions and successfully fulfilled the criteria set by the Washington Treaty. It is also the largest and longest lasting political-military alliance in the world. The dark side of volunteering is the commitments agreed upon prior joining NATO and its fulfilment and continuing effort after the country is safe and secure. One of the troubles of today’s members is how many of them would be today capable of meeting all the conditions and joining NATO, thus how many today are free riders.

Before even considering joining NATO, the country should be aware of all the advantages and disadvantages of the alliance membership. Among the positives, the often proclaimed Article 5 and the principal of collective defence is an obvious one. Are there any others? There are positives on the side of the candidate country. Joining NATO is a long-term process, which may take more than ten years. During those years the candidate country has to undergo a long list of reforms in the economic, political, and legal sector. These reforms probably would have never happened had not been for a strategy of NATO membership. As a proof there are few successful stories among NATO members today.

As far as positives for NATO are concerned one of the most pivotal is a stronger partnership with new countries. This is not only the case for the new coming coun-
tries, but for their partners already established and for their neighbours as well. With new countries there is a possibility of new partnerships. Second important positive is the diversity of capabilities. The incoming countries are actually making the co-operation within NATO cheaper because they offer their capabilities to the allies and partners and the states would be more inclined as NATO countries to sign multilateral agreements in procurement or any other way of defence and military co-operation.

Few obstacles need to be mentioned as well. NATO is not all about positives. Some NATO negativists or realists often say that the obvious obstacle is Russia. The situation in Ukraine, according to them, is the result of geopolitical dispute between NATO (meaning the United States) on one side and Russia on the other. One of the most prominent of this realistic approach is John Mearsheimer.

This is, however, not true. The Russian invasion in Crimea, followed by a proxy and then military actions in the eastern part of Ukraine are a result of the weak government of Viktor Yanukovich. Russians simply used the short instability the country witnessed during the Maidan protests which were a response to Yanukovich’s failing to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union. NATO was not playing any part in this negotiations and thus not even in the Russian actions. We may argue that Russia has been more aggressive towards Ukraine and Georgia since the pledge at the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008 that both countries will become NATO member states. However, Russian political leaders must assess that this process takes more than a decade and it is not necessary to carry out a military response.

Another argument connected to Russia is that NATO should stop the enlargement process if it does not want risk the war with Russia. The counterargument in this case is “would Russia risk a war with NATO over enlargement?” Stretching the area is also often used as a negative side of enlargement. The number of countries that would be covered by Article 5 and the “security umbrella” is getting bigger.

On the other hand, Article 5 does not mean a military response to every attack. This is also often misinterpreted when there is a perception that if one NATO country is attack the rest of the Alliance would send all of their capabilities. Article 5 clearly states that all NATO members are obliged to help to prevent another attack by “whatever they deem necessary.” The military option is on the table, but it is not essential or required.

Also, NATO cannot enlarge into infinity. Articles 5, 6, and 10 of the Washington Treaty are strictly talking about the European and North American Area. So any
other strong NATO partners (Australia, Japan, etc.) are unable to join NATO although easily meeting all the criteria.

During his inauguration, Slovak president Andrej Kiska said that Slovakia should not be a border state of NATO. This statement was praised by a number of representatives of the security community in Slovakia. However, if we look at this statement closely, there is a major problem with it. As I mentioned above NATO cannot enlarge to become the new UN. Somebody simply has to be a border country. It is not about being the border country or not. It is about creating and maintaining such capabilities that will protect the border against all attacks.

Now I would like to focus on the relationship between NATO candidates and the Alliance itself. There are several important issues candidate countries must have resolved before even thinking about joining NATO. First, it is the public opinion. The polls should express be at least a 50% of public voices favourable to joining NATO. There is no need for a referendum and as often showed the public opinion may be different every month. However, if the government’s decision to join NATO is supported by a majority vote, the mandate for implementing necessary reforms is clearly stronger.

The next criterion which ties directly to the abovementioned one is political will. If the political leadership is strongly persuaded about the NATO membership, it should work hard on educating the public. However, it should not neglect mentioning the negatives of the membership and the crucial commitments that the membership entails. Third, the border issues must be resolved. This is a crucial condition set by the Alliance. By enlarging the candidate country will become a border country of NATO and it is unimaginable not to have a strong and secured border with all its neighbours. A good neighbourhood policy and firm relations are also advantageous.

And what should NATO do? First of all, it should not sugar-coat the membership. After 65 years of its existence NATO has survived a lot of transitions both inside and outside the Alliance. It has witnessed governments transforming and thus changing the political environment. Today, the Alliance should invest more, if willing to keep its Open Door Policy, into raising awareness of its daily existence among candidate states. It should work closely with members and non-members to share the experience from the integration process as well as from the post-integration process. NATO currently possess a very strong Public Diplomacy Division and it should use its potential more. Lastly, NATO should acknowledge the work and progress the candidate countries already made. Nevertheless, it should still be strong in statements if the candidate countries are lagging in terms of necessary reforms.
In conclusion, NATO will remain a security guarantee in the Western Balkans. No other region in Europe should be more important and no other region presents both challenges and opportunities for NATO. There is a necessity of a solid relationship between NATO and possible candidate countries. Both parties should be aware of their counterpart positions. The diplomatic relations should be honest and both parties should work intensely towards their common goal. However, the common goal must be achieved only after both parties pre-agreed on their individual strategies within the Alliance and within the candidate country. The candidate countries ought to be prepared for a long-term commitment to its obligations.

The next NATO Summit will be in Poland. This is an important step in recognizing the eastern part of the Alliance and the purpose of collective defence. On the other hand, it is also important for the countries in the region, particularly the V4 countries which have now the opportunity to prove their strong position within the region and within the Alliance.

Thank you.
The context of EU enlargement has fundamentally changed over the last fifteen years. In 1994, the European Union was made of strong economies which allowed for constant economic growth and prospering markets. The first enlargement wave took place in this positive framework, granting immediate benefits to new members. Those conditions have significantly changed in the recent years and the last enlargement wave took place in an economic atmosphere all but optimistic. That changed context is the background which needs to be taken in consideration to understand the challenges we are facing with both the EU and NATO enlargements, today. First of all, Europe has lost its economic attraction capacity, at least in terms of immediate benefits. Secondly, soft power skills and long term normative benefit still provide an overall positive reputation. However, structural problems, coupled with bread and butter politics, confuse the scenario. And all criticalities are going to worsen, as winter is coming.

Then, for effective integration to take place, resulting in a win-win situation, a number of conditions should be fulfilled. From the point of view of member states, the engagement and commitment of candidates countries are of basic importance. Also, of course, both NATO and the EU have to actively engage, keeping in mind the complex background discussed above. Last but not least, the very member states are indispensable for any result to be achieved. They should intervene in the process at the very beginning, supporting integration through bilateral engagement and strong regional co-operation.

Norway, for instance, is very active in the defense sector, promoting co-operation with all non-NATO countries in the region. With Serbia and Macedonia in particular, strict co-operation practices have been established in the military and medical sector. And Norway gets a double win out of these activities in the region.
First, it is provided with constant supply of capacities it does not have. Second, the international dimension of co-operation facilitates internal structural reforms. Indeed, reforms of the Norwegian defense sector are traditionally linked to the changing international context and have never resulted exclusively from domestic initiatives. This kind of bilateral engagement, which could be done in all sectors, even combining them, promotes structural reforms while ensuring stability and security in the whole region.

The changed background also refocused the debate around national interests. What has been achieved by the European Union with the Serbia-Kosovo agreement is of fundamental importance and it could not have been realized without the two countries being convinced it is first of all in their interests to engage in a constructive debate, not only as a way to European integration but also as a mean to solve their very specific problems. The combination of all the above mentioned conditions is the basis for an effective European integration, now more than ever focused on national interests, which are significantly different from those perceived almost twenty years ago.

In short, national interest is the pivot around which the engagement of all parties, candidate countries, member states, the EU and NATO is turning around. But for regional co-operation to take place a broader framework is necessary, as the Norwegian examples clearly shows. Indeed, the dialogue inevitably stops on technicalities if an international co-operation framework is not provided. On the contrary, when co-operation is established under an international agreed framework, it grows deeper and wider.

Concluding, I would like to say that I fully understand the valid argument, according to which further enlargement creates some structural problems for the EU institutions. However, one should be careful with the statement “yes you are welcome, but unfortunately the house is full” because it could easily backfire.
Session 4

UNFINISHED BUSINESS?
THE BOSNIAN ISSUE
Today I will do something I usually do not. I will try to be as succinct as possible while presenting my proposal on Bosnia. With the initiative “Compact for Growth” the European Union is focusing on a reform agenda, wider than before. I think this is very prudent, given that countries like Bosnia Herzegovina are deadlocked with no immediate prospect for progress. To this regard, recent protests in Bosnia Herzegovina sent a clear message to the European Union, as well as to the domestic government. Economic reforms are a priority for the people living there. And the new European approach is indeed working in putting economic issues at the forefront of the electoral agenda. It follows that politicians in Bosnia Herzegovina will have to address those issues in their campaigns as well.

The elections are getting closer and what I suggest to the European Union is to act quickly, announcing the plan before the elections or at least immediately after.

Now I would like to go a little deeper into the proposal I have in mind. Bosnia Herzegovina should be offered a progressive process of EU integration. Even if it is very difficult to be put in practice, an early candidacy should be proposed to the country, provided that the new government accepts the following negotiation conditions.

First, the process should start by focusing on economic reforms, rule of law and fight of corruption and organized crime. In this picture constitutional issues are critical.

Secondly, rather than solve them independently before the negotiation process even starts, it is suitable and it makes sense to open what I call a “func-
“functionality chapter”. That last would be very similar to the Chapter 35 of the accession negotiation of Serbia. It would address the functionality of the Bosnia Herzegovina institutional setup over the long period. Negotiation progress in every other field should be strictly linked to the functionality chapter, which represents the condition upon which every other chapter can even be closed. In the end, what will be achieved is an agreement upon a mechanism which by all purposes represents the new institutional setup of Bosnia Herzegovina. That agreement would include the EU directly, as one of the parties sitting across the table.

Also, it is of main importance that respective sovereignty and borders between the countries are crystal clear. But rather than facing this problem head on, early in the process, what I propose is a bottom-up approach which would eventually achieve the same goal. By all practical terms, the functionality chapter would become a constitution complementary to the Dayton Agreement, sketching out the institutional framework and administrative mechanisms.
STATE CAPTURE, CITIZEN PROTESTS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION. HOW TO EXIT THE BOSNIAN QUAGMIRE

GLOBAL CHANGES - LOCAL IMPACT

To talk about the Western Balkans today is to talk about the seismic geopolitical shifts in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The region - still very much a security recipient - is deeply affected by the twin challenges of the Ukraine crisis and the escalating events in Syria and Iraq, triggered by the self-styled Islamic State (IS). The gridlocked state building processes in the Western Balkans - particularly Bosnia and the FYROMacedonia seem to be in a reverse mode - are easy prey for the revisionist politics of Putin’s Russia and Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman forays. The ripple effects from Syria/Iraq - the Euro - Jihadi temptation for youngsters across the continent - have deepened the long-lasting socio-economic malaise in the region.

Take Bosnia and Herzegovina: While the Serb-dominated Bosnian entity Republika Srpska is both economically and financially ever more dependent on Moscow (whose spoiler strategy against the EU works well in the Balkans), Ankara, in spite of its mounting problems in its southern neighbourhood, is increasing its economic engagement in the region and deepening its political footprint in Bosnia. Typically, it has decided to delve into domestic politics. A rather small yet significant example: Turkey’s governing party has funded this year’s presidential election campaign of Bakir Izetbegovic’s SDA, the leading Muslim party.

AND WHERE IS THE EU?

The May 2014 elections to the European Parliament, the Juncker Commission and a new High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, whose first task will be to reform the EU’s neighbourhood policy – including its ill-devised “Eastern Dimension” –, provide Europe with the renewed opportunity to get it right this time. Will Mr Juncker and Ms Mogherini live up to these expectations?
Considering the unprecedented geopolitical challenges on Europe’s eastern and southern borderlines, the “Bosnia project” - cast at the crossroads of those two theatres of conflict- warrants a fresh and comprehensive approach indeed.

The European Union’s mission in Sarajevo -the largest worldwide- will soon get a new leadership. Considering its lacklustre role since its inception there is ample room for performance enhancement. It is to be hoped that the new Head of Mission will be backed up politically by Brussels and by the leading member states like Germany, Italy or the UK.

There is one important lesson to be heeded: A policy for and with Bosnia has to resolutely depart from its long established methodical orthodoxy - still dominated by outdated paradigms of counter-intuitive conditionality and misunderstood local ownership- and move forward to institutional functionality, financial affordability and empowerment of civic stakeholders. After many trials and errors on the part of the International Community, whose Bosnia engagement over the years is nevertheless commendable, a European re-set with the aim to arrest the ongoing disintegration of Bosnia is warranted.

Consequently, the “Dayton approach” has to be replaced by an unambiguous and forward leaning EU strategy. The many levels of governance, the petrified ethnic cleavages, are the main drivers in Bosnia’s dismal economic performance. In order to move towards candidate status, Bosnia needs state structures fit to coordinate its sub-levels, the two semi-autonomous entities and the Federation’s ten cantons plus Brcko. In turn, European inaction, camouflaged by “strategic patience”, is unsustainable.

Let’s be clear: A dismantled Bosnia - plit along ethnic lines - would spell trouble and further weaken the already weak political and social cohesion of the whole region.

Not to forget: The US-led Dayton strategy of 1995 was, inter alia, to forge a decentralized yet unified state of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to forestall the prospect an idle and potentially destabilizing Muslim statelet in the middle of Europe.

THE DOMESTIC SCENE

After twenty years of massive external intervention - military, humanitarian, economic, political alike - which in turn led to local dependency and political procrastination, the seemingly surprising outburst of civic protest in February 2014 - under the watchful eyes of OHR and EU - could arguably become a cross-ethnic
game changer in the ongoing struggle for peace, prosperity and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The slogan “Gladni smo na tri jezika – We are hungry in three languages” describes the Bosnia quagmire well. It is, however, too early to assess the lasting impact of this violent outburst on the country’s future. Will the mostly Western funded NGO community and the proponents of the newly established Forum movement get together and form a stronger civic force?

While the October 2014 elections were still old style, the big question is, will an invigorated civic movement become politically active in next year’s local elections?

Whatever the outcome, it is time to draw some conclusions from the public outcry, which echoes across imposed ethnic divides and has for the first time in years put the so-called political elite in a temporary state of stupor.

After Tuzla, Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka and the other venues of grass roots protests, will Bosnia ever be the same? A young generation of activists - still a mostly urban minority - has started to communicate in “one language”. They have spoken out against the ingrained “politics of fear” and for a new beginning in divided Bosnia by addressing the bread and butter issues of their country. However, will they succeed in their quest for a united democratic country? A very readable book - Unbribable Bosnia. The Fight for the Commons (edited by Damir Arsenijević, Nomos, 2014) - collecting essays by activists and leading intellectuals, is a first attempt at tackling the issue of civic stateless in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The “state capture” by Bosnia’s leading politicians, the cosy and corrupted relationship of politics and business, the partisan grip on local media and public broadcasters, the twisted election law - all these mutually reinforcing factors make it rather unlikely that there will be much democratic change post-October 2014.

I vividly remember how I used to remind the war weary citizens that there seems to be only one real unifying element in this otherwise split country -and this is “siromastvo”, widespread poverty. Whatever the ethnic background, Bosniacs, Croats, Serbs and - famously - the “Dayton-Others”, life was equally bad for most of them.

My appeal back then to the local politicians was to give up their rhetoric of hate and exclusion and unite in the work for the common public good.

Not much has changed in the past dozen years, I must admit. On the contrary citizens appear to be help - and hopeless.
Thus, chances are for even more radical civic protests if no sensible perspective is been put forward.

A RE-SET FOR BOSNIA

The EU therefore needs to realise that more of the same is not an option.

It is not about a disingenuous “pause” in enlargement - who would ever believe that within five years any of the candidates would be ready? So let’s apply the longue durée-approach and think in terms of consolidation of the “EU space” in Europe’s south-eastern corner.

To be sure, such a re-set is not about “more” or “less” intervention and tutelage, more or less “ownership”, as the polarizing discourse went over too many years.

It will be up to the EU to squarely set the reform agenda.

This has to start with reversing the domestic institutional roll-back of the past six or so years. Such efforts need to prioritize state level responsibilities in such areas as EU-coordination, foreign trade or regulatory matters, to name but a few.

The focus has to turn to how to achieve real and sustained progress in consolidating the state and make the much-touted “European perspective” real.

The EU High Representative for External and Security Affairs along with the Commission and the newly appointed Commissioner, Austrian “Gio” Hahn, whose envelope includes the European Neighbourhood Policy plus enlargement, will have to put the European Union’s West Balkan policy on a “political” and more assertive footing. To bring the regional economic dimension to the fore - as the reinvigorated Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) is intent to do - to insert a competitive element amongst the regional candidates. Establish a transparent and comparative framework of criteria and benchmarks. The road to Brussels has to become more palpable for the people.

DOMESTIC REFORM AND EUROPEAN COMMITMENT

Two issues stand out:

1. The reform of the dysfunctional political system

The EU’s prime task has to be to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a functioning state: democratic, European and in the service of its citizens.
One caveat: undoubtedly, the Dayton Constitution will eventually have to be amended. This presupposes a modicum of common purpose amongst any future leadership. However, do not start with yet another Constitutional reform exercise; it will most likely fail again. Instead, propose a combination of top down/grass roots approaches; support a broad public discourse about the affordability and feasibility of the state and its too many layers of governance.

Because of its multi-ethnic make-up and its war legacy, Bosnia needs a decentralized yet lean and efficient – i.e. pared down – governance structure. Post-war Dayton’s effort to square the ethnic-civic circle needs to be replaced by a political system fit for Europe. There is no place in this part of Europe for separatist fiefdoms or “frozen conflicts” - they heat up faster than we would like.

One major domestic stumbling block: In spite of its hollow pro-European rhetoric, an increasing number of politicians from the region do not any longer want to join the EU system of rule-based checks and balances, of administrative transparency and political responsibility.

At the core of Bosnia’s quagmire is the realisation that to join Europe seriously endangers its overblown clientelist politics. Politicians in Bosnia (and in its neighbourhood, to be clear) have long since realised that a swift move of their countries towards the EU would severely curtail their public status and ill-gained fortunes.

Simply put the fate of former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader -put behind bars by an emboldened judiciary- has led them to reconsider their European call.

A critical domestic public along with supporters of a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina have to ask themselves:

- Who needs four levels of governance along with 170 “Ministers” and close to 800 “Lawmakers”, in a country of merely 3,8 million inhabitants?
- Why should those few who regularly pay taxes - along with international donors and creditors - fund a notoriously inefficient bureaucracy?

The scandalous political non-performance to help the victims of this year’s terrible floods that destroyed most of what was rebuilt after the war of 1992-95, is a dramatic case in point of Bosnia’s inept politics. Urgently needed foreign medical supply -just one example of too many- was stuck at some border crossing for more than a week because of a petty conflict over local competencies.

While too many local authorities are stuck in bureaucratic mishmash and incapable to help, affected businesses are receiving EU assistance; so far, some 460 Bosnian SMEs have applied for recovery grants.
While the EU was quick to make funds available for battered Bosnia, the bigger picture must not be left aside.

2. A comprehensive “Future Bosnia” plan

Even 20 years after the end of the hostilities, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a special case. It still is the weakest link in the West Balkan chain of states; and will remain so for a long time. It thus warrants continued attention.

Only recently the EU has taken the initiative to launch a “Compact for Growth and Jobs” to tackle unemployment and corruption, including yet another justice sector reform. A commendable initiative. But more needs to be done.

It is to be hoped that the so-called Berlin Process, initiated by Federal Chancellor Merkel, will bring the regional leaders to engage more systematically in this joint endeavour.

This fresh approach needs to be ambitious. Nothing less than a coordinated political, economic and social re-launch, based on the critical assessment of 20 years of state building is needed.

Important achievements need to be recognized:
- Yes, there was no resumption of war, many refugees and IDPs were able to return, property rights were enforced, the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and the creation of basic institutional structures – including SSR – have survived the general backslide since 2006. But Bosnia is still very much an unfinished state.

Arguably more important for a re-start is to recall what has not or only partly worked:
- Bosnia and Herzegovina is more than ever separated by self-serving and corrupted politics, reinforced by deep popular mistrust; no Bosnian-wide coordination mechanisms to speak of exists.
- Justice Sector Reform: A compromised rule of law legacy continues to hamper any development and needs urgent attention.
- Education Reform: The “two schools under one roof”- policy is an educational and societal time bomb.
- Economy/Business: A phony privatisation scheme has early on destroyed in the most “uncreative” way what was left by the war. The financial and economic crisis has done away with the rest. Here the EU can help to manage a turnaround.

Such a “Future Bosnia” plan has to be devised between local reform forces and the EU, with support from the US. Over the past two decades practically every as-
pect of what needs to be reformed in the public domain has been analysed by local reformers and international stakeholders alike. There is thus no shortage of ideas, concepts and proposals. Everybody seems to know which changes are necessary, but nobody does it.

Funds, a real concern in this age of diminished financial expectations, are not the issue; consider this: Only last year alone, Bosnia lost 45 million Euro, which is almost half of available IPA funds, due to the government’s inability to fulfil longstanding legislative commitments. Participation in IPA II was cancelled by the Commission; hundreds of EU-millions are in jeopardy for the period 2014-2020.

Perversely, non-compliance with the so-called “5 plus 2 conditionality” has so far rewarded the political elite with the standstill that serves them so well.

There is urgent need for a serious remake of the EU’s conditionality policy.

Another example: since neighbouring Croatia joined the EU in 2013, Bosnia’s agricultural exports to its most important trading partner came to a screeching halt. In spite of years to bring the phyto-sanitary and veterinary laws and regulations up to EU standards, the Government was simply incapable to agree. Bosnia’s economy is again loosing because its irresponsible politicians would rather incriminate each other than do what they are elected to do – legislate and implement; reform and create a favourable business environment.

There are considerable funds and opportunities around; what is missing is the political will to put them to work.

PRIORITY BOSNIA

These two measures -jointly executed- pre-suppose a serious change of strategy; two points stand out:

First, Bosnia has to again become a European priority. Under the leadership of Brussels and supported by neighbours and friends like Germany, Italy and Austria, the new Government, once in place, will have to commit to the most urgent tasks that the country confronts.

Will the new/old leadership get it?

I am afraid, real change will only come to Bosnia when a new generation of policy makers and civic activists take charge. The old elites - many politically active since the war times - have lost confidence. It would be best to admit that they
have abysmally failed their constituency and draw the proper consequences. The post-election period might be a good occasion for those who bear the most responsibility for Bosnia’s disaster to simply leave politics. They would do the country and its citizens a last big favour.

Generational change seems to be the only way to turn the country around.

Citizens - professionals and academics, decent and committed politicians (there are quite a few around!) - need to take “samoodgovornost” seriously; the February 2014 protests are a stern writing on the wall.

There is hope left, that an assertive civic leadership will soon be in place – with a common vision for Bosnia, yet realistic in its demands; reaching across perceived ethnic divides, open to all who are willing and ready to invest time and effort in rebuilding their country.

Second, the so-called International Community - which has lost its interest in Bosnia long ago - has to realize, that its successful humanitarian intervention of the 1990s has run its course. In order to secure the Dayton “acquis”, rather, what is left from it, a relaunch is needed. Some 20 years after the end of the Bosnian war, new domestic and European institutional structures have to replace the Dayton set-up, its civilian implementing arm, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) included. How can we allow for temporary organisations, set up to robustly lead the country out of the war zone, to be still around; operationally incapacitated and in competition with the EUSR, a drastically reduced team, personally committed but politically irrelevant, where its Steering Board has become easy prey of the new Cold War. Russia now refuses to even sign up to the “European perspective” of Bosnia.

Consequently, the international civilian presence has become part of the problem, rather than the solution that it was until 2006. While SFOR successfully transformed into EUFOR, the civilian part of Dayton implementation is stuck in a time bubble.

“Europeanisation” and “EU Membership Building” are the key words for a future, much leaner and more adequate presence.

Rather than for an unrealistic, even undesirable “Dayton II” we need to aim for “Bosnia and Herzegovina I”.

Together we have to be realistic and demand the impossible:
The new EU leadership, led by an invigorated European Council, with the US as the indispensable partner, mentored by European stakeholders like Germany and regional neighbours, have to unite and give a comprehensive effort fresh impetus.

In view of the unprecedented geopolitical challenges, it is in the very interest of Europe that Bosnia be brought on an irreversible path towards EU membership. Clearly, accession cannot happen tomorrow; it will take a long, very long time. What is urgently needed is a tangible process, a European roadmap.

This journey has to start immediately – supported by many civic voices but in one language.

Cambridge, Harvard University, October 2014
As an outsider, I would like to bring to you my personal point of view, taking some distance from what could be considered the general opinion with regards to Bosnia Herzegovina. The observation I would like to start with is that Western Balkans slipped out of our screen. On the one hand, because of the developments in the Black Sea region, in Crimea and Ukraine. On the other hand, because of violence in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Balkans, and especially Bosnia, have overriding significance for Western security and that is the reason why this conference is so timely and important. Indeed, it is time to bring the question of the Balkans into the broader security agenda. The European Union cannot afford to ignore the Balkans. As it has already been pointed out, the region still is home to local particularisms much more than other parts of Europe and diverges significantly from the main values adopted and supported by the EU.

Moreover, centrifugal forces are overwhelming in Bosnia, because of the very nature of the population living there. Indeed, confessional and communal differences take the place of nationalism in the country, drawing deep dividing lines among the population. Bosnia in particular lacks the magnetic force able to keep together the other countries of the Balkans. And all the external factors I have mentioned before, may have the effect of reinforcing those centrifugal tendencies.

It follows, ironically, that Bosnia represents, more than any other South-Eastern Europe country, an exemplary case to which to apply EU integration principles. It is characterized by cosmopolitanism, it can come together only by means of pluralism and it needs a very strong policy of reconciliation. In short, what needs to be done in Bosnia resembles incredibly the way Western Europe managed to put together the European construct. Of course, in order to achieve any positive stra-
strategic option, the necessary prerequisite is the support by the Bosnian population at large.

Now the point is whether this perspective is realistic and to what extent. A general enlargement fatigue can easily be observed and the very appeal of the European Union is diminishing, while Mr Juncker has ruled out integration in the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, the EU cannot afford to ignore unsettled post-war conditions on its territory. The European neighbourhood has become threatening not only for the EU but also for NATO and global security, more generally. Indeed, Balkans are Europe’s neighbours and are also an integral part of the transatlantic region. Also, since the Ukrainian crisis broke out, what happens in the Balkans is also of global concern.

Therefore, to effectively pursue the aforementioned strategic options, a number of requirements are necessary. First, it is essential to have the EU and NATO collaborating. That collaboration should include all significant actors in the neighbourhood, among which Turkey. Also, for the collaboration to work, a common understanding of issues among parties is fundamental. In particular, full consensus on the necessity to strengthen a pluralist state as a means for converging to European values and principles, is an essential prerequisite.

That said, the task is made more difficult by Turkey itself, which is recently diverging in a significant way from its Western allies.

My colleagues and I have just published an analysis of Turkish polices towards the Balkans region and Bosnia in particular. We came up with a few headlines, which go as follows. The European Union and Turkey both desire an immediate end of the conflict. However they very much differed in their approaches. The EU has been more adamant by imposing on an early step its institutions. Turkey, instead, has adopted a facilitator role until 2010.

In the end, the Turkish approach has been more effective than the European one, in terms of acceptance of its activities in the region. However, it is important to notice that Turkey’s activities have been motivated by national interest related to the region. Insofar its ultimate goals diverge significantly from those of the European Union. Nevertheless they both worked to achieve political stability, promoting good governance.

Recently the rhetoric from Ankara has changed, starting to exhibit not only divergence tendencies but also sectarian degenerations. The main Turkish assistance to Bosnia has been through the Turkish Overseas Development Agency, which
basically directed resources to the exclusive benefit of the Bosnian Muslim population. As a matter of fact, efforts have gone, in large part, to the reconstruction and renovation of Ottoman heritage buildings, triggering the fear of new Ottomanism among the Balkan Christian population.

The Turkish–Bosnia nexus has played right into the fear of nationalists, revealing a potential to reinforce religious particular among those groups. And religious particular is perhaps the greatest threat to the integrity of the state. Also, the deep lasting distress between the three constituent Bosnian groups not only represents a security threat but also paralyzes effective governance in the whole region. In this scenario, Turkish development policies encourage religious nationalism and undermine all mediation efforts, contributing even more to the political paralysis and its negative economic effects.

Now, along with the diverging policies put in place by Turkey, Russian actions enter the scene in Crimea and Ukraine first, but also the Middle East and the Black Sea region. Turkey has not criticized, or spent a word on that regard. Even though the country is dependent on Russian energy and construction industry, still some milder form of criticism could have been registered. It is possible to state that Turkey has recently become a part of the problem rather than its solution.

In my concluding remarks I would like to bring some positive perspective into the quite pessimistic scenario I have been discussing, quoting what has been said by some Turkish exchange student. They have been asked for the reason why they decided to go to Bosnia Herzegovina and answered as follows: “We are here because Bosnia Herzegovina is going to enter the European before Turkey will”.

Western Balkans – The futures of integration
A HOUSE IN VELIKO TARNOVO
I am grateful to be here, part of this panel, as a citizen of Bosnia Herzegovina and exactly as a citizen I would like to share with you an objective analysis of the problems affecting my country.

Bosnia is standing still, paralyzed. There is no movement forward, no reforms have been implemented. The progress made was more or less imposed by the High Representative or some other international actor. Processes towards the European Union and NATO are completely locked. Unlike the other countries in the region, which are making two steps forward and one step backwards, we are not making steps forward at all. And, standing still, we are losing the opportunity to became what we are supposed to be.

Bosnia Herzegovina, indeed, is not only interested in a European process, it is made for it, because of its very character, the pluralism and its historical heritage which perfectly integrate into the European scenario.

However not even the constitution is functioning and the debate around it opens to possible degenerations either in the direction of further sectarianism, for instance dividing the country into three entities, or in the direction of a unitary state, which is simply not workable.

For what concerns the economic sphere, growth rates do not even register half the figures before the war and employment has risen to 40% of the working population. Reconciliation and normalization processes have not started yet, the rule of law does not exist and the deterioration of human rights and democratic procedures more generally, is visible at first sight.
That is due in large part to the fact that Bosnia Herzegovina is led by corrupt and incompetent politicians which govern the country on the nineties recipes: homogenization of ethnic groups and fear of the others. Moreover, that rhetoric addresses a pre-political society, which inevitably will perpetuate the platforms of politicians, and the coming October elections are not promising any relevant change.

The scenario is all but optimistic. Politicians are firmly against European integration, while they try to maintain the current corrupted state of things, where the lack of rule of law allows them to profit from their acquired privileges. However, that anti-European behaviours do not take in account that more than 67% of the citizens are in favour of joining the European Union. They can see that there are no other solutions, that nothing viable appeared in the last years and that the way forward is towards those values and principles which are already embraced by the other 28 European countries.

Bosnians already share European values and they would like to become part of the European family, because all things considered they know that this is the only way to address all the problems they experience every day. The process of integration, not the membership, must be clearly promised to Bosnians. It could take ten or twenty years, it does not matter. What matters is to exit this schizophrenic situation and clear the air on the way into the future.

Now I would like to move on the security issue, by addressing two significant points. The first one concerns what has been possible to observe during the pre-electoral campaign. It is a fact that some of the political leaders in Bosnia are ready to restart military and armed conflicts, in order to stay in power. It still not clear if they would be capable of doing that, but it still remains a firm intention, openly expressed.

The second points is related to the common threat of jihadist terrorism. Risks will increase as frustration raises among the Muslim population in Bosnia Herzegovina. Fortunately, to this regard, I have the pleasure to share some very positive news with you. The new head of the Muslim - Husein efendija Kavazović - community in the country is a moderate, non-aggressive leader. The old one can be considered an evil figure, misusing religion in the worst possible way, while selling a moderate picture to most of the Western countries, above all the United States. That is not the case anymore.

The new leader is very clear about the role of Islam, as well as about the relation between State and Religion. He also takes a strong position against ISIS and terrorist activities, in particular in terms of what has been done on behalf of Islam
in countries like Iraq and Syria. His very important role for the Muslim community will most probably reduce risks when it comes to the possible threat of jihadist terrorism within Bosnia.

Concluding, I would like to address the role of the international community, and the questions it raises. Even if I am not among those who are convinced that the international community has to solve Bosnian problems, I do believe that it has a moral role to help in the process.

To this regard a couple of observations stand out. First and more generally, interest in Bosnia Herzegovina is decreasing. Second, common policies towards the country are missing. Third, the international community is acting against its own principles. Indeed, reforms have been put in place including just political leaders, without a parliamentary body or according to any democratic procedure.

Also, the international community works on defined priorities. That approach resulted into the fact that human rights, for instance, have been addressed only for two years and forgotten immediately after, without any plausible explanation but “it is not a priority anymore”. That considered, what is needed is a more active role of the international community in Bosnia Herzegovina, under the umbrella of an integrated strategy able to support all actors, among which the civil society as a whole stands out, to generate progress. Only this new international energy, along with the recent citizen movements, will be able to bring about some change, to be understood and necessarily addressed also by the political sphere.
Let me first of all thank the NATO Defense College Foundation for organizing this conference that we are proud to host here at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I would also like to thank all the participants for providing us with original ideas, analysis and food for thought for a broader debate on the western Balkans and the enlargement processes of the European Union and NATO.

From an historical perspective, in the last two decades, all the countries of the western Balkans have moved on from the past and progressively adopted a new political approach. Today they are reshaping their bilateral relations in the region and are looking at the common European house as a chance to secure a prosperous and peaceful future and as a place where previous longstanding contrasts can be overcome. This approach has been fostered by the transformative power of the EU and NATO. The power of attraction exerted by the fundamental European values increased the determination of Western Balkans countries to become full members of the European family. By focusing in particular on new forms of regional co-operation in the region, as this conference has done, we can build a new paradigm to announce the progress of integration of the Western Balkans in the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The growing importance of the regional dimension of the Western Balkans is an aspect which is proving to be crucial to stabilize the region as well as national governments. The Regional Co-operation Council, the South-East European Co-operation Process and the Central European Initiative have assumed a role of regional fora where the Western Balkan countries meet in a context of mutual co-operation, very different from the sometime confrontational climate that characterizes their bilateral relations.

We are celebrating today the 25th anniversary of the Central European Initiative
to which Italy has provided a fundamental contribution as the promoter and one of the founding members. From its inception and until the creation of the South-East European Co-operation Process, up to the evolution of the Stability Pact and the Regional Co-operation Council, the Western Balkans region has seen an increased confidence in the support that regional organizations are providing to the stabilization of the area. We therefore welcome the new domains of cooperation these organizations open at the regional level and we appreciate the growing interaction among the values forum.

While the overall stability of the area is strongly benefiting from a new reinforced co-operation, deriving from a revitalized activity of regional organizations, the bilateral relations between the main actors of the Western Balkan region are also shaping a new political scenario. The Serbia-Kosovo case, thoroughly discussed during the conference, represents a paramount example of a positive change in national policies in the region. Strong nationalistic feelings gave way to a more pragmatic approach, instrumental to the progress in the European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Today, with the agreements on the normalization of relations signed in 2013, Serbia and Kosovo have given proof of their genuine commitment to open a totally new scenario in their history. We expect that the two countries will now continue to co-operate and complete the job already started, which is pivotal two both nations to progress on their respective European paths. In short, the Serbia Kosovo example can be taken as a successful model of cooperation, inspired by a pragmatic policy watching at the future of the European integration.

Other areas of the region are, unfortunately, still suffering from the situation of political deadlock which is undermining progress on the Euro-Atlantic path. The Bosnian case represents the example of an unaccomplished integration process. The country stands in the middle of the path and needs to restart its walk towards the common European house. The launch of the compact for growth and prosperity and a package of proposal by the EU focused on economy and social reforms, can represent the external factor which we hope can help to move Bosnia forward, especially once a new government will be in place, following the political election next Sunday.

The stability of the region, which continues to be one of the priorities for the countries of the area as well as of European partners, cannot be ensured without the provision of a security framework. To this regard, NATO remains, together with the EU, responsible to exert the strong transformative power of the Atlantic alliance. The progressive involvement of the countries of the region in the activities of the alliance, in full respect of political and historical links, and of the geopolitical
position of each one of them, through different models of partnerships, is in any
case an additional proof of the flexibility shown by the Alliance during the last
years, as well as of its attraction capabilities on the Western Balkans.

The progress made by Western Balkans countries towards the EU and NATO
integration, is a success story waiting to be completed in some of its chapters. We
have extensively talked about the so called enlargement fatigue. Let me be clear on
this point, the Euro-Atlantic perspective is essential for the success of the historical
transformational process in the region. Only continuous and strengthened efforts
by all actors both within and outside the region, will allow this to happen. And
Italy has made this a priority of its EU presidency and intends to move forward
before the end of the year.

I am personally convinced and confident that fundamental values, such as
democratization, rule of law, full stability and security, as well as prosperity, will
eventually prevail and ensure the full success of this process. Let me conclude by
congratulating once again, the NATO Defense College Foundation and the dele-
gation of the Italian semester of presidency of the EU, as well as the Balkan Trust
for Democracy.
SPEAKERS’ BIOGRAPHIES

Ambassador Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo
President, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome
He has much experience in a number of areas, not just international relations. Including industry, energy, aerospace. A specialist on security affairs worldwide. He is a frequent public speaker.
Senior Advisor of several Ministers of Defense, with a strong focus on the various Balkan crisis. In 2000 he has been a founding member of the Political and Security Committee of the European Union with Javier Solana.
Deputy Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance from 2001 to 2007. His mandate was mostly carried out in relations with sensitive countries, such as those in the Gulf, in the Southern Mediterranean, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Chairing the Atlantic Council on several missions.
Senior Strategic Advisor of Enel from 2008 to 2012. A member of the Board of the Italian Space Agency and later of Finmeccanica in 2013-2014.
A teacher of European Security and Defense Policy at the LUISS University, School of Government, Rome. Columnist for “Europa”, daily of the Democratic Party of Italy.

Alessandro Politi
Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome
Alessandro Politi is a global political and strategic analyst with 30 years of experience. Director of the NATO Defense College Foundation, the only NATO-affiliated NGO think tank.
He is senior researcher for the Italian MoD (CeMiSS-Centre for Military and Strategic Studies) regarding the strategic monitoring of Latin America. He leads in the
CeMiSS also the Global Outlook project, regularly published in Italian and English in the first months of each year and a flagship project of the Centre. He is responsible for the Italian presidency during 2014 of the CEMRES, the intergovernmental virtual think tank of the 5+5 Defence Initiative. In December he will present the conclusions to the Granada 5+5 ministerial.

He teaches geopolitics and intelligence at the SIOI (Rome) and political leadership/analysis at the IASSP (Milan). He teaches conflict management, crisis, peace-making and analysis at different governmental centres.

His most recent hearings at the House Foreign and the House Defence Committee were on future orientations of the Italian foreign policy and European armaments co-operation. He has been advisor in Italy and abroad to four Defence ministers, one National Armaments Director, one Intelligence Co-ordinator, one Chairman of the Oversight Intelligence Committee. Afterwards he has been facilitator at the WEF Global Shaper club of Rome and acting director of the School of Intelligence Analysis at a private Italian university.

Born in Germany, lives in Rome. He has published as author, co-author or editor 18 books on strategic and security matters. His most recent book in Italian was about the possible Israel-Iran war, while in English he has published and edited the CeMiSS Global Outlook 2014. His next publication will be the CeMiSS Global Outlook 2015 both in English and Italian.

Matteo Tacconi
Scientific Advisor, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome

Matteo Tacconi is an independent journalist. Born in 1978, he writes for a wide range of Italian publications. He is the co-founder and managing editor of Rassegna Est, a website providing political and economic news from Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Matteo has been covering these regions since he started his career, often reporting on the ground. He has written several analysis focusing on Eastern Europe for NDCF.

Anton Bebler
President, Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia, Ljubljana

Professor Anton Alex Bebler studied various subjects in Slovenia, Serbia, Russia, USA, UK, France and earned his Ph.D. in Political Science at University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA in 1971. Since 1972 he has thought at University of Ljubljana, Slovenia and became a full Professor of Political Science and of Defence Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. For several years he regularly taught at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, also occasionally lectured at various universities and institutes in North America, Europe and Asia and served as member of several national and international advisory boards and panels. Dr. Bebler authored several books, wrote chapters in numerous international compendia and over 300 scholarly articles on various topics in the field of in-

**Haakon Blankenborg**  
*Director General Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway*

Haakon Blankenborg (born 8 April 1955) is a Norwegian politician for the Labour Party. He took a degree in history and political science at the University of Oslo in 1980. He served as a deputy representative to the Parliament from Oppland during the term 1977–1981, and was elected in 1981. He chaired the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs from 1993 to 2000. In 2005 he left Parliament to become Norwegian ambassador to Serbia. Since 2011 he has been General Director at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.

**Gordana Delić**  
*Director, Balkan Trust for Democracy, Belgrade*

Gordana Delić is currently Director of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Ms. Delić has over sixteen years of experience in the non-profit sector. She has worked in the area of Civil Society Development and gained extensive experience in program management and development, grant solicitation, corporate philanthropy, research and planning, election processes, get-out-to vote campaigns, human rights and reconciliation. Ms. Delić has the knowledge of both non-governmental and governmental sectors in the Balkans as well as the knowledge of international donor strategies, programs, procedures and operations in CEE and SEE regions. Prior to her employment at the Balkan Trust for Democracy Ms. Delić worked at the Freedom House Serbia. Her International experience includes six years of work on different democracy development programs in Slovakia.

**Benedetto Della Vedova**  
*Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs of Italy*


Srdan Dizdarević
President, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Sarajevo

Srdan Dizdarević was born on 29.09.1952 in Sarajevo. After graduating from the Faculty of Philosophy, Dizdarević started his career in non-governmental organizations. From 1995 to 2010 he was the first President of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, based in Sarajevo. In 2002 he was elected as Director of the Coalition of NGOs in Bosnia Herzegovina “IZBORI”. Remarkable is his election as Executive Director of the Human Rights House of Sarajevo in 2010. Last year Dizdarević was re-elected as President of the Helsinki Committee in Bosnia Herzegovina. In 2014 he announced his retirement. Dizdarević is author of various publications in Serbian, English and French. In 2007 was awarded of the Legion of Honour by French Republic.

Ahmet Evin
Professor, Sabanci University Policy Institute, Istanbul

Ahmet Evin is a Senior Scholar in Istanbul Policy Center and Professor at Sabancı University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and Jean Monnet chair at Sabancı University. Prior to his appointment at Sabancı University Ahmet Evin, the founding dean of Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabancı University, taught at New York University, Harvard University, Hacettepe University (Ankara), University of Pennsylvania (where he also served as director of the Middle East Center), University of Hamburg, and Bilkent University in Ankara (where he headed the Department of Political Science). Evin’s private sector experience includes corporate management at Philip Mor-
ris International; he represented Philip Morris Companies in Ankara and was responsible for the legal and administrative aspects of direct foreign investment in a major consumer product sector during its transition from state monopoly to international competition.

As director of education of the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, a Geneva-based international development foundation, he coordinated the Aga Khan Program for Islamic Architecture at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and in cooperation with that US-based resource centre assisted in the development of architectural education in Asia and Africa. He has also served as consultant to the Aga Khan Award for Architecture as well as an editor of the Award publication.

Evin initiated, with the European Commission’s support, a policy dialogue on the future European architecture, EU’s eastward expansion, its Mediterranean policy, and the customs union agreement with Turkey. He has established, with the European University Institute (EUI), Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, EU-Turkish Observatory, and several joint programs of professional training and policy research with academic institutions and non-governmental organisations, such as ELIAMEP, USIP, The Kokkalis Program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Evin is also the founding member of Turkish Economy and Social Studies Foundation and the Middle East Studies Association of North America.

Dušan Fischer,
Research Fellow, Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava

Dušan Fischer is a Junior Research Fellow in the International Relations Program at the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, a think-tank based in Bratislava, Slovakia. Previously he held the same job at the Center for European and North Atlantic Affairs, also in Bratislava. He holds two MA degrees. One from Comenius University with a major in International Relations and European Studies, and one from Heidelberg University where he majored in American Studies, class of 2014. He spent a semester at the Mykolo Romeris University in Lithuania where he researched on security and geopolitics of the Baltic States. Dušan also graduated from the Program in Advanced Security Studies – Capacity Building at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He has published extensively on the topics of transatlantic security and U.S. foreign and domestic policy issues, and he regularly contributes to Slovak news channels and newspapers.

Fernando Gentilini
Director for Western Europe, Western Balkans and Turkey, European External Action Service, Brussels

Fernando Gentilini was born in Subiaco (Rome) on 2nd March 1962 and he joined the Italian Diplomatic Service in 1990. He has served in the Italian Embassy in
Addis Ababa and in the Italian Permanent Representation to the E.U. in Brussels. In 1999 he was seconded to the Policy Unity of the Secretary General/High Representative for the CFSP in Brussels and after that he has been deployed in several Balkan hot spots. In 2006 he was appointed Deputy Diplomatic Advisor to the Italian Prime Minister. In 2008 he was nominated NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. He is currently director for Western Europe, Western Balkans, and Turkey for the European External Action Service.

Istvan Gyarmati  
President, International Centre for Democratic Transition, Budapest

After earning his Ph.D. in Military Science, Dr. Gyarmati worked at the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, the Association of Hungarian Journalists, and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He served as the Alternate Permanent Representative of Hungary to the IAEA from 1981 to 1986. He participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, he was the deputy head of the Hungarian delegation at the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Vienna in 1989, and he participated in the negotiations surrounding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. From 1992 to 1994 he led the Hungarian delegation to the expert meetings of the Helsinki Summit, the Hungarian expert delegation to the London Conference on Yugoslavia, and the Department for Security Policy and Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After serving in various positions in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, he became Deputy Secretary of State for Integration at the Ministry of Defence in 1996 then Undersecretary for Policy in 1998. He held top leadership positions at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon, the EastWest Institute, and the OSCE/ODIHR Election Monitoring Mission in Moldova. He was President and CEO of the ICDT since 2005 and became President of the Centre for Democracy Public Foundation in 2011. He is again President of ICDT since 2013.

Denis Hadzović  
Secretary General, Center for Security Studies, Sarajevo

Denis Hadzović has been the Secretary General of the Centre for Security Studies in Sarajevo since its establishment in 2001. In the capacity of this position, Mr. Hadzović has led several research projects in the area of security in Western Balkans. He has devoted himself to enhancing civil–military relations, democratic control of the armed forces, reforms of the security sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as human security issues. In his previous capacity, Mr. Hadzović worked in the Ministry of Interior Affairs of FBiH, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of BiH as well as the Head of the office of the Minister of European Integrations, within the Council of Ministries of BiH. He has been an editor of several books, studies and has successfully implemented research projects. Mr. Hadzović holds a Master’s degree in the International Relations and Diplomacy from the Faculty of
Political Science in Sarajevo, where he is currently a PhD candidate.

Zoran Jolevski
Minister of Defence of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Skopje
Zoran Jolevski, born July 16, 1959 in Skopje, Republic of Macedonia was appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia to the United States in March 2007. In November 2008, he also has been appointed the Macedonian Government’s chief negotiator on name differences with Greece under the auspices of the United Nations.
From 2000 to 2004, Ambassador Jolevski was Chief of Staff to the late Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski, and served as the Chief Adviser to the Macedonian Government on Macedonia’s World Trade Organization accession.
He has served in various other capacities with the Macedonian Government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
He was the Chief of Party to the Macedonian Business Environment Activity, and from 2004 to 2006 the Chief of Party to the World Trade Organization Compliance Activity. Ambassador Jolevski founded and has been the first President of the Institute for Economic Strategies and International Affairs – “Ohrid”. He served also as a President of “The Boris Trajkovski International Foundation” from 2004 to 2005. Prior to his appointment as ambassador he was member of the Boards of number of companies. He also was Vice Chairman of the UN/ECE Committee on Trade, Industry and Enterprise Development (2005-2007), as well as a Member of Team of Specialists on Internet Enterprise Development at UN/ECE (1999-2003).

Luigi Mattiolo
DG European Union, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome
Born in Rome, October 28, 1957
Degree in Political Science (University of Rome, July 15, 1980)
Joins the Foreign Service on August 1st, 1981
1981 - 1983 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate-General for Immigration and Social Affairs
1983 - 1986 Italian Embassy in Moscow, Second Secretary;
1986 - 1988 Italian Embassy in Bern, First Secretary;
1988 - 1992 Italian Embassy in Belgrade, First Secretary;
1993 - 1994 Prime Minister’s Office, Deputy Diplomatic Advisor;
1995 - 1997 Secretariat of the European Union – Unity for Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP);
1997 - 2001 Permanent Representation to the European Union in Brussels, Counsellor
2001 - 2004 Permanent Representation to the United Nations in New York, First Counsellor;
2004 - 2005 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate-General for European Integration, European Correspondent and Coordinator for Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP);
2005 - 2008 Permanent Representation to NATO in Brussels, Deputy Permanent Representative;
2008 - 2012 Ambassador of Italy to Israel
2012 - Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Director-General for the European Union

Petar Mihatov
*Head of Sector for International Defence Cooperation and Security, Ministry of Defence, Zagreb*

**Professional Career:** Ministry of Defence
April 2013 – Head of International Defence Cooperation and Security Sector
Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs
2012 – Head of Division for Southeast Europe
2010 – Advisor to the Minister
2009 – International Visitor Leadership Program (US Department of State)
2009 – Chief of Staff of the State Secretary for Political Affairs
2008 – Chief of Staff of the State Secretary for European Integration
2008 – Head of Section for CFSP and External Relations of the EU
2004 – 2008 – Croatian Embassy in London (political affairs)
2003 – Desk Officer for disarmament / arms control
2002 – UN Disarmament Fellowship
2000 – NATO Desk Officer
1999 – OSCE Desk Officer

**Education:** PhD (Political Philosophy) from University of Philosophy in Zagreb
Master of Science (Political Theory) from London School of Economics and Political Science, Diplomatic Academy in Zagreb, BA from University of Philosophy in Zagreb (Philosophy and Information Science)

**Personal information:** Born on 5 September 1972 in Zagreb Married, two daughters

Jelena Milic
*Director, Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, Belgrade*

She was a co-worker of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of SCG and Serbia, Goran Svilanović, during his mandate in the Stability Pact for South East Europe Department for Democracy and Human Rights. Previously she worked as a political analyst and researcher for the International Crisis Group and the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. She is a member of the Forum for International Relations, an invitation only think tank, set up by the European Movement in Serbia. She maintains an OP/ED col-
umn in a leading Serbian daily newspaper Danas, and a blog on Blic Online, the most frequently visited online portal in Serbia. She was awarded a short internship with prestigious Paris based think-tank CERI of the Science Po University by the European Commission. She is, among other, author of the essay The Elephant in the Room: Incomplete Security Sector Reform in Serbia and its Consequences for Serbian Domestic and Foreign Policies, published in: Unfinished Business: The Western Balkans and the International Community (2012) by Džihid, Vedran and Hamilton, Daniel, eds., published by the Center for Transatlantic Relations Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC.

Her areas of expertise are: Serbian security sector reform; Serbia – EU relations; Serbia - NATO relations; Kosovo; links between non-violent regime changes, transitional justice and security sector reforms.

Solomon Passy

*Founder & President of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, Sofia*

Dr. Solomon Passy is the founder and president of the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria. It was the first pro-Atlantic NGO to be founded in a non-NATO member state. The Club works to promote Bulgaria’s integration with and role in the Atlantic Alliance, and all Euro-Atlantic political, security, and economic structures. Although no longer Chairman and CEO of the Atlantic Club, Passy remains heavily involved and has been Honorary President since 2001.

Solomon Passy also founded the Bulgarian Green Party in 1990 and was elected into the Bulgarian National Assembly. As an MP, in 1990 he drafted legislation to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and apply for membership in NATO. This was the start of a public discussion about the end of the Warsaw Pact and also the idea of NATO expanding eastwards. His commitment to cut Bulgaria’s ties from the past and join the new Europe continued with drafting the bill for Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union. Passy was also involved in a number of other historic bills including the abolishment of the death penalty and was co-author of the Bulgarian Constitution.

In 2001 Passy was elected back into the Bulgarian parliament, where he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of Prime Minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg, a post he remained in until 2005. As Minister of Foreign Affairs Passy oversaw Bulgaria becoming a NATO member state. He also began negotiations with the USA for the establishment of a joint US-Bulgarian military base in Bulgaria, which was ratified in May 2006. Passy was also involved in the conclusion of negotiations over EU entry, signing and ratifying it, and setting the date of accession to January 2007. As Minister he also served on the United Nations Security Council (2002-2003), where he helped define the security policy of the international community in the post-9/11 world. He was also involved in the decision to support the USA and NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In 2004 Passy was appointed as Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). During his leadership of the OSCE reached a consensus on a number of reforms, including: increased efforts to fight anti-Semitism, xenophobia and discrimination, contributing to democratic processes in Georgia and Ukraine, and supporting the peace efforts in Georgia, Moldova, Kosovo, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Organization resumed its activities in the Middle East and reached out to new countries in Asia. Solomon Passy has been the recipient of a number of awards for his work in international politics and diplomacy. In 2004 he was awarded the first Balkan Peace Award by the South East European Journalists Union (Edirne) for his contribution to peace in the region. He also received the American Jewish Committee’s Distinguished Statesman award in recognition of distinguished leadership to advance the principles of peace, democracy and international cooperation in 2002.

Wolfgang Petritsch
President, Austrian Marshall Foundation, Vienna

Wolfgang Petritsch is presently President of the Austrian Marshall Foundation and the Joseph A. Schumpeter Fellow at Harvard University. Mr. Petritsch, was ambassador to the OECD in Paris (2008-2013) and Prior to that assignment, Mr. Petritsch was ambassador and permanent representative of Austria to the specialized UN agencies in Geneva; to the WTO; and to the Conference on Disarmament. Ambassador Petritsch began his career in the 1970s. From 1977 to 1983, he was the press secretary and subsequently the chief of cabinet of the Federal Chancellor of Austria. He then served as minister-counsellor at the Austrian delegation to the OECD. In 1984, he was appointed director of the Austrian Press and Information Service in the United States and minister plenipotentiary at the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York. Then, in 1992, he returned to Vienna as head of the Department for Multilateral Economic Co-operation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1994, Mr. Petritsch became head of the Department for Information on European Affairs at the Federal Chancellery and a member of the Federal Government’s EU-accession Task Force. From 1995 to 1997, he was head of the Department for International Relations of the city of Vienna. From 1997 to 1999, Mr. Petritsch served as ambassador to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During his tenure as ambassador, he was appointed special envoy of the European Union for Kosovo and EU chief negotiator at the Kosovo Peace Agreement talks at Rambouillet and Paris. From 1999 to 2001, he was chair of the “Succession Commission for the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” in charge of distributing the public assets and liabilities among the successor states, resulting in the Vienna Agreement of 2001. In 1999, Mr. Petritsch was named high representative of the international community for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1972, he received a doctorate in Southeast European history and politics from
the University of Vienna.

Florian Qehaja  
*Executive Director, Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, Prishtine*  
Florian Qehaja is the Executive Director of KCSS and one of the co-founders of KCSS. He served previously in the position of Head of Operations (2008–2011). In addition to that, he has been an assistant lecturer at various universities in Kosovo. Florian is author of several scientific publications in the security field; as well as author/co-author of local, international publications regarding the field of security, rule of law and regional cooperation. Further, He is an international consultant on Security Sector Reform, Rule of Law and Good Governance cooperating with leading international governmental and non-governmental organisations. He is frequently invited in prestigious research events in the capacity of KCSS or senior researcher in the related field. During the period of time 2005-2007, he has worked at the International Relations Office of the University of Prishtina in the position of Coordinator of the International Summer University of Prishtina. Florian Qehaja is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Social Sciences (Department of Security Studies), University of Ljubljana. His PhD research is “Local ownership and security sector development in Kosovo”. Moreover, he has graduated at the University of Sussex (United Kingdom) in Contemporary European Studies (MA); whereas, he obtained Bachelor’s Degree in Law at the University of Prishtine.

Albert Rakipi  
*Executive Director, Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana*  

Stefano Silvestri  
*Former President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome*  
Stefano Silvestri has been President of the Institute for International Affairs from 2001 to 2013. Since 1985, he is a columnist for Il Sole 24 Ore. He has been Secretary of State for Defence (January 1995 - May 1996), advisor to the Secretary of
Silvestri works as a consultant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and Ministry OF Industry.

As a professional journalist, he was reporter and columnist for the Globe (1982), member of the Steering Committee of the European (1979), and wrote about issues of foreign policy and defence for several national newspapers.

He was professor on security issues in the Mediterranean, at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University (1972-76) and worked (1971-72) at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

Silvestri is a member of the Board of Directors of the Italian Industries Federation for Aerospace, Defence and Security (AIAD) and the Trilateral Commission.

Christophe Solioz

Political Analyst, former Secretary General of the Centre for European Integration, Geneva


Goran Svilanović

Secretary General of the Regional Cooperation Council, Sarajevo

Goran Svilanović took office as the Secretary General of the Regional Cooperation Council on 1 January 2013, following the appointment by the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) Foreign Ministers in Belgrade on 14 June 2012. A Serbian diplomat and politician, he previously served as Co-ordinator of the OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (2008-2012). In November 2004, he became Chairman of Working Table I (democratization and human rights) of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, where he served until the end of 2007. He was member of the Senior Review Group of the Stability Pact, which proposed the transformation of the Stability Pact into the Regional Co-operation Council. From 2000 to 2004, Mr Svilanović was Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, which was renamed to Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. Between 2000 and 2007, he was a Member of Parliament. He was President of the Civic Alliance of Serbia political party (1999-2004). Mr Svilanović has worked with a number of organizations and committees, such as the Centre for Antiwar Action (1995-1999), the International Commission on the Balkans (2004-2006) and the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights (2007-2008).

Andrei Tarnea  
*Executive Director, Aspen Institute Romania, Bucharest*

He is a member of the Aspen Institute Romania and currently serves as the executive director of the Institute. He is a career diplomat having joined the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1998. His diplomatic career includes working in bilateral affairs, serving with the ministry’s spokesperson, and as head of the early warning unit in the policy-planning department. He was advisor to the foreign minister between 2002 and 2004. Previously he worked for the Centre for Policy Studies and Comparative Analysis, and co-led a political and social affairs think tank. He also worked in the private sector and the Romanian Senate where he served as an advisor and researcher with the legal affairs committee. During 1996 he was the executive director for a mayoral electoral campaign in Bucharest. He was on foreign posting in Brussels between 2004 and 2010 as director of the Romanian Information Centre in Brussels, and Councillor to Romanian Embassy. In 2007 he took on the role of director of the Romanian Cultural Institute in Brussels and he served as vice president and then president of EUNIC Brussels between 2008 and 2010.
The NDCF is a unique think-tank: international by design and based in Rome, due to its association with the NATO Defense College. Its added value lies in the objectives stated by its charter and in its international network.

The charter specifies that the NDCF works with the Member States of the Atlantic Alliance, its partners and the countries that have some form of co-operation with NATO. Through the Foundation the involvement of USA and Canada is more fluid than in other settings.

The Foundation was born three years ago and is rapidly expanding its highly specific and customer-tailored activities, achieving an increasingly higher profile, also through activities dedicated to decision makers and their staffs. It is the first time that the NDCF contributes to a EU Presidency.

Since it is a body with considerable freedom of action, transnational reach and cultural openness, the Foundation is developing a wider scientific and events programme.
This conference is an absolute first in EU presidencies witnessing a close collaboration between the EU Presidency of an important member state like Italy and a NATO-affiliated foundation. The objective of the NATO Defense College Foundation was first and foremost to refocus in a timely and practical way the issue of the Western Balkans, avoiding the continuation of the complacent laissez-faire of the past decade.

Against this backdrop the continental repercussion of the Ukrainian crisis has remembered to everybody that political evolution and stability are interdependent and thus indivisible for what concerns the national and collective responsibilities of the EU and NATO in the area. On the other hand the international community should not rush in focussing on the apparent threat of the day forgetting the substantial underlying and long standing problems. This was the lesson of the Marshall Plan and this should be the idea driving the next enlargement in a not too distant future.

Indeed with a forthright, factual and practical debate the conference has shown that integration has made great strides, the problems to be solved need engagement and determination from all sides and that NATO and the EU are there to stay not as passive actors.

The conference is structured into four panels in a circular structure opening with regional co-operation and logically closing with Bosnia. The first panel analyses the evolution of regional co-operation vis-à-vis the perspective of the integration in the EU. The second uses the Serbia-Kosovo agreement as litmus test and case study to see how national political cultures are able to transform the scars of past wars into acceptable multi-cultural relationships.

With the third panel the speakers broach not only the nuts-and-bolts of the different accession paths, but also the fundamental issues affecting the quality and the strategic outcome of this new inclusion wave taking into account both the role of Turkey and the reverberations of the Ukrainian crisis.

This background naturally influences in the short term also the reflection on Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose long-issue is the nationalistic manipulation of politics in order to escape necessary reform and social reform.